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ABSTRACT 
 
Development and Evaluation of a Safeguards System Concept for a Pebble-fueled High 
Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor. (August 2011) 
Ernest Travis Ngure Gitau, B.S., Missouri University of Science and Technology 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William S. Charlton 
 
 Pebble-fueled high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) technology was first 
developed by the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1950s. More recently, the design 
has been embraced by the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa. 
Unlike light water reactors that generate heat from fuel assemblies comprised of fuel 
rods, pebble-fueled HTGRs utilize thousands of 60-mm diameter fuel spheres (pebbles) 
comprised of thousands of TRISO particles.  
As this reactor type is deployed across the world, adequate methods for 
safeguarding the reactor must be developed. Current safeguards methods for the pebble-
fueled HTGR focus on extensive, redundant containment and surveillance (C/S) 
measures or a combination of item-type and bulk-type material safeguards measures to 
deter and detect the diversion of fuel pebbles. The disadvantages to these approaches are 
the loss of continuity of knowledge (CoK) when C/S systems fail, or are compromised, 
and the introduction of material unaccounted for (MUF). Either vulnerability can be 
exploited by an adversary to divert fuel pebbles from the reactor system.  
It was determined that a solution to maintaining CoK is to develop a system to 
identify each fuel pebble that is inserted and removed from the reactor. Work was 
performed to develop and evaluate the use of inert microspheres placed in each fuel 
pebble, whose random placement could be used as a fingerprint to identify the fuel 
pebble. Ultrasound imaging of 1 mm zirconium oxide microspheres was identified as a 
possible imaging system and microsphere material for the new safeguards system 
concept.  
 iv 
The system concept was evaluated, and it was found that a minimum of three 
microspheres are necessary to create enough random fingerprints for 10,000,000 
pebbles. It was also found that, over the lifetime of the reactor, less than 0.01% of fuel 
pebbles can be expected to have randomly the same microsphere fingerprint. From an 
MCNP 5.1 model, it was determined that less than fifty microspheres in each pebble will 
have no impact on the reactivity or temperature coefficient of reactivity of the reactor 
system. Finally, using an ultrasound system it was found that ultrasound waves can 
penetrate thin layers of graphite to image the microsphere fingerprint.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Before Little Boy and Fat Man were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 
spread of nuclear weapons technology was a concern. Not until November 1945 when 
the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (U.K.), and Canada issued the “Three Nation 
Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy” was pen put to paper about the need to spread 
nuclear energy knowledge, but only if effective and enforceable safeguards could be 
established. In January 1946, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R), the 
U.S., U.K., and their allies within the United Nations (UN) created the United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission. Until 1948 when the commission was dissolved, the goal 
of member countries was not to just prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons 
technology, but to eliminate the weapons and technology.
1
 
 From these initial steps to control nuclear weapons technology, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was born. An agency initially proposed by U.S. 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his “Atoms for Peace” speech in December 1953, 
the IAEA was created with the ratification of the IAEA Statute in 1957. The Statute 
stated that the main objective of the IAEA was to spread peaceful nuclear technology, 
while ensuring that the assistance the IAEA provided was not used for military purposes. 
The IAEA achieved this objective by promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, 
providing necessary materials and scientific information for the peaceful development of 
nuclear technology, and establishing and administering safeguards designed to ensure 
that materials and information provided by the IAEA was not used to further any 
military purpose. The Statute specified that should any member country use IAEA 
assistance to further military purposes, the UN Security Council would be responsible 
for determining the consequences for that member.
2
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 The Statute specified the rights and responsibilities the IAEA possessed in order 
to establish and administer safeguards. These rights and responsibilities included:
2
 
 the verification of nuclear facility design information 
 the requirement that all safeguarded facilities maintain operating records 
 the call for and receipt of progress reports from UN member countries 
 approval of reprocessing of spent fuel to ensure the material is not diverted 
 the ability to send IAEA designated inspectors to nuclear facilities to determine if 
a diversion has occurred, and 
 the right of the IAEA to remove any IAEA assistance or material from a State 
that fails to correct IAEA identified violations.  
 The IAEA eventually came to establish its first universal safeguards system with 
the January 1961 approval of Information Circular 26 (INFCIRC/26) The Agency’s 
Safeguards. INFCIRC/26 defined: the official principles of IAEA safeguards; the 
materials, equipment, and information subject to IAEA safeguards; the initiation and 
termination of IAEA safeguards on these materials, equipment, and information; and 
specified how the safeguards measures outlined in the Statute would be applied.
3
 
INFCIRC/26 was extended in 1964 to cover larger reactor facilities. This safeguards 
system was revised again in September 1965 with INFCIRC/66 The Agency’s 
Safeguards System (1965).
4
 This revision allowed the safeguards system to work more 
effectively and simplified the language used in the provisions to increase understanding 
of the safeguards system.
1
 This safeguards system was later revised twice more to 
include application of safeguards to reprocessing plants, fuel conversion plants, and fuel 
fabrication plants.
4
  
 As the U.S. and U.S.S.R. began to rapidly expand their nuclear arsenals in the 
1950s and 1960s, it became apparent to many in the international community that a 
treaty needed to be established that prevented the spread of nuclear weapons. Composed 
by countries (also known as States) within the IAEA, the Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was passed in 1968.
1
 Entering into force in 
1970, the NPT was comprised of 11 articles that promoted the role of the IAEA in 
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strengthening international security.
1
 These articles focused on the non-proliferation of 
weapons by States, the pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and the 
undertaking of “negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”5 
 Shortly following the NPT was INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) The Structure and 
Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the 
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
6
 INFCIRC/153 established a 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and each State party to the 
NPT. INFCIRC/153 defined a detailed framework for safeguards including what 
information on nuclear facility design was to be shared with the IAEA, operating records 
and reporting systems necessary for IAEA safeguards, IAEA inspection procedures, and 
the relationship that records, reports, and inspections would share in determining the 
safeguards compliancy of a state.
1
 In addition, INFCIRC/153 further defined the 
objective of IAEA safeguards as “the timely detection of diversion of significant 
quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons” and “deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.”6 
 Today, INFCIRC/153-type Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) are 
the most common agreement between the IAEA and States. The CSA framework was 
supplemented with the introduction of INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) the Model Protocol 
Additional to the Agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency for the Application of Safeguards in September 1997. Created due to the 
undeclared nuclear activities of the Republic of Iraq discovered in 1991, INFCIRC/540 
grants the IAEA “complementary inspection authority” to that provided in 
INFCIRC/153. These strengthened safeguards allow IAEA access to all civilian nuclear 
facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle present within a State. Previously, the IAEA could 
only inspect reactor facilities, fuel conversion facilities, enrichment plants, fuel 
fabrication facilities, and fuel reprocessing facilities. With INFCIRC/540, the IAEA 
now:
 7
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 has access to uranium mines and nuclear waste sites; 
 has access to all buildings on the site of a nuclear facility on short-notice; 
 is allowed to collect environmental samples at locations besides declared 
facilities; 
 can use internationally accepted communications systems to transmit data; 
 inspectors are issued multi-entry visas to facilitate unannounced inspections; 
 receives information from States about research and development occurring 
in-country related to the nuclear fuel cycle; and 
 receive information from States about the manufacture and export of critical 
nuclear-related technologies.  
 
1.1 Next Generation Nuclear Facilities 
 Just as the IAEA expanded its responsibilities to cover different types of nuclear 
facilities like fuel enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities, the IAEA must continually 
evaluate the effectiveness of their safeguards system for next generation designs of all 
types of nuclear facilities. One facility type that is constantly evolving is nuclear 
reactors. Dozens of designs of nuclear reactors exist in the world today, however many 
can be described by reactor types. Most reactor designs can be classified as the light 
water reactor (LWR) type. Other common reactor types include on-load fueled power 
reactors and research reactors. The IAEA has over-time gained much experience in 
safeguarding these reactors and as such, has developed robust and specific approaches to 
safeguarding these facilities. While the exact safeguards measures utilized at each plant 
can be different, the same types of measurements and activities are performed.
8
 
In some cases new reactor designs cannot be classified under a current reactor 
type. Currently, these reactor designs are classified as “Other types of reactors”. 
Reactors classified in this type include fast breeder reactors and high temperature 
reactors with pebble fuel.
9
 Due to the range of reactors present in this category, the 
IAEA has only developed generalized requirements that must be met by each reactor. In 
some cases there is only one or a handful of a particular reactor design in the world, so 
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the development of a standard safeguards approach for each reactor design presents a 
new challenge for the IAEA. The pebble-fueled high temperature gas-cooled reactor 
(HTGR) is such a design that has a wide range of applications including electricity 
generation, hydrogen production, and steam production for industrial facilities.
10
  
 
1.2 History of Pebble-fueled High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGRs) 
The pebble-fueled HTGR design was pioneered by the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) in the 1960s. The Arbeitsgemeinschaft Versuchsreaktor (AVR) pebble-
fueled HTGR operated from 1967 to 1988 in Western Germany. The AVR was an 
experimental reactor was operated as a testing facility for pebble-fueled HTGRs. The 
AVR, although a small reactor at about 45 megawatts-thermal (MWt), was able to 
demonstrate that a reactor fueled by small fuel pebbles, and cooled by gas, could be 
safely operated. Over its lifetime, the AVR was home to tests that primarily focused on 
qualification of pebble fuel. Varying combinations of uranium and thorium and fuel 
sizes were tested under a wide range of operating conditions to determine optimum 
combinations for safety and economics.
11
  
Using experience gained with the operation of the AVR, the FRG designed and 
built the Thorium High Temperature Reactor (THTR) that served as the link between the 
experimental AVR facility and commercial scale facilities. Although the THTR only 
operated from 1985 to 1988, the over 16,000 hours of operational experience laid the 
foundation for the pebble-fueled HTGR designs that are being pursued today by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of South Africa (RSA).12,13  
The PRC began their pebble-fueled HTGR program in the 1992 with the 
approval to build reactor at Tsinghua University’s Institute of Nuclear Energy 
Technology site outside of Beijing. Completed in 2000, the HTR-10, a 10 MWt pebble-
fueled HTGR, has been used by the PRC as a research facility. Much like the AVR, the 
HTR-10 has come to be a testing ground for the PRC in HTGR technology including 
testing of pebble fuel and verification of inherent safety features associated with pebble-
fueled HTGRs.
14
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In 1995, the RSA was looking for a way to increase electrical generating capacity 
in anticipation of increased demand. At the time, to build a coal fossil fuel plant would 
have required a large capital investment and some 5 to 8 years to construct. This type of 
plant would be located near the coal fields in the central part of the country. Deemed not 
economically viable, the government was interested in pursuing a means of electricity 
generation that would require lower capital costs, have a construction time on the order 
of 18 to 24 months, and could be located in coastal regions or remote areas. Conducting 
a feasibility study on modular, high temperature, helium-cooled reactor design options 
led the RSA to pursue the pebble-fueled HTGR design.
15
 Building on experience from 
the AVR and THTR, the RSA began to design a new facility based on proven 
technologies. Initially designed to generate 100 megawatts-electric (MWe), this design 
came to be known as the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR).
15
 
As countries like the RSA and the PRC develop their domestic nuclear industries 
with pebble-fueled HTGRs, it is expected that the design will be exported to additional 
countries.
16,17
 Countries most interested in the pebble-fueled HTGR design are likely to 
be countries that do not have capital for a larger facility, that need to generate electricity 
in underdeveloped or hard to reach areas. More often than not, these will be non-nuclear 
weapons states. As such, it is important that a safeguards approach be developed for the 
pebble-fueled HTGR that can reliably meet the safeguards objectives outlined in 
INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/540.  
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2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 South African Pebble-fueled HTGR Program
1
 
The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) is designed as a two unit co-
generation plant, meaning the facility produces electricity and steam for industrial 
facilities. Each unit produces 250 MWt using a helium coolant and an indirect steam 
cycle. The plant is designed to have a 60 year lifetime, with an expected power 
generation efficiency of 40%. Each reactor unit contains 360,000 fuel pebbles when 
operating at equilibrium.  
The PBMR operates by generating heat from each pebble. This heat is removed 
with the helium coolant that enters the core from the bottom and is carried to a steam 
generator. The steam generator removes the heat from the helium, and transfers the heat 
to water. The water is turned into steam that drives a turbine connected to a generator to 
produce electricity. As the steam cools, the condensate water is fed back into the cycle to 
produce more steam, and the cooled helium is circulated back into the reactor core. Fig. 
1 is a flow diagram for the PBMR.   
 
 
Fig. 1. Flow diagram for PBMR.
18
 
 
                                                          
1 
When this research began, the PBMR was being redesigned and marketed by Westinghouse and PBMR 
(Pty) Ltd. However, by late 2010 the largest investor in the design, the South African government, had 
withdrawn from the project and the PBMR design has since been abandoned. The information presented 
henceforth on the PBMR design stems from information released on the final redesign.
  
  
 
8 
Unlike traditional light water reactors where the fuel remains stationary while the 
reactor is operating, each of the 360,000 fuel pebbles is recirculated through the reactor 
by a fuel handling system. As pebbles are removed from the bottom of the reactor core, 
the pebbles are circulated back to the top of the reactor core and reinserted. This process 
continues until each pebble is no longer usable as fuel and is sent to spent fuel storage. 
When the reactor is initially loaded, the core is filled with graphite pebbles. These 
pebbles are used to reduce the distance the fuel pebbles will drop when placed in the 
core.
18
  
Each pebble spends on average 100 days in the reactor core before being 
recirculated. Each pebble is expected to reach an average burnup of 80,000 to 92,000 
megawatt-days per ton of uranium (MWd/tU). Building on fuel experience from the 
AVR and THTR, each PBMR fuel pebble is comprised of Tristructural Isotropic 
(TRISO) fuel particles.
18
 At the center of each TRISO particle is a 0.5 mm diameter 
uranium dioxide (UO2) fuel kernel. Each kernel is covered in a 0.095 mm thick layer of 
porous carbon that acts as a buffer with additional layers and provides additional volume 
for fission products gases to escape. Next is a 0.04 mm thick inner layer of pyrolytic 
carbon (IPyC) that acts as a barrier to contain any gaseous fission products that escape 
the fuel kernel. A 0.035 mm thick layer of silicon carbide (SiC) is next. This layer 
provides structural strength to the fuel kernel, as well as, a barrier to any fission products 
that diffuse through the IPyC layer. Lastly, there is a 0.04 mm thick outer layer of 
pyrolytic carbon (OPyC) of the same thickness and composition of the IPyC that 
provides further structural strength to the TRISO particle.
18,19
 In total, there are 
approximately 12,000 TRISO particles in a 50 mm diameter region in each pebble. This 
50 mm diameter region is then covered in a 5 mm thick layer of graphite, making each 
fuel pebble 60 mm in diameter.
18
 An example of this TRISO particle and fuel pebble can 
be seen in Fig. 2.  
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Fig. 2. TRISO particle and fuel pebble design for PBMR.
18 
 
Each fuel kernel contains 8 weight percent (wt%) 
235
U; however, at the time the 
PBMR project was abandoned, additional research was being performed on fuel 
development.
18
 In previous designs of the PBMR, two enrichments of pebbles, each 
containing 9 g of uranium, were used. The core was initially loaded with pebbles 
containing 5.7 wt% 
235
U. As the reactor operated and these pebbles were discharged, the 
core was loaded with pebbles containing 9.6 wt% 
235
U. The PBMR would continue to 
operate with this 9.6 wt% 
235
U fuel for the remainder of the facility’s operating 
lifetime.
20
  
When operating at equilibrium, 3000 fuel pebbles are circulated throughout the 
system each day. Of those, approximately 350 are permanently discharged as spent fuel 
and are replaced with an equal number of fresh fuel pebbles. Fuel pebbles that have been 
permanently removed from the system are stored in large storage containers located 
onsite at the reactor facility.
18
  
When the reactor is shutdown for long periods of time (e.g. maintenance), a 
Reserve Shutdown System (RSS) consisting of 18 boreholes in the inner reflector are 
filled with small spheres of an absorbing material. These RSS channels can also be used 
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to completely shutdown the reactor in an accident scenario. During normal operations, 
the reactor is controlled by six control rods positioned in the outer reflector.
18
 In 
previous designs, there were 36 helium riser channels on the periphery of the outer 
reflector. These channels allowed the helium coolant to be pumped into the reactor 
vessel, up to the top of the PBMR core, where the helium was then forced down through 
the core and extracted at the bottom of the pressure vessel.
10
   
 
2.2 People’s Republic of China (PRC) Pebble-fueled HTGR Program 
2.2.1 HTR-10 
Much like the PBMR, the HTR-10 uses pebble fuel and a helium coolant to 
generate electricity indirectly using steam. The HTR-10 core contains 27,000 fuel 
pebbles, each with 8300 UO2 fueled TRISO particles. Each pebble contains a total of 5 g 
of uranium enriched to 17 wt% 
235
U. Each pebble is expected to reach an average burnup 
of 80,000 MWd/tU. The fuel pebble and TRISO particle composition is the same as the 
German developed pebble and particle also used by the RSA. The HTR-10 also contains 
RSS-type channels, control rods, and helium rising channels located in the same regions 
of the reactor as the PBMR.14  
2.2.2 HTR-PM 
Building on experience gained with the HTR-10, the PRC has made progress on 
designing a commercial scale prototype pebble-fueled HTGR, known as the High 
Temperature Reactor-Pebble bed Module (HTR-PM). Development of this new design 
began in 2001 and the reactor is set to start generating electricity in 2013.
21
 Like the 
PBMR, the HTR-PM is a two unit reactor facility, where each reactor uses a helium 
coolant to produce steam to drive a turbine to produce electricity. Each reactor is capable 
of generating 250 MWt and has a design lifetime of 40 years. Each unit contains about 
420,000 fuel pebbles with 7 g of uranium in each pebble enriched to 8.9 wt% 
235
U. Each 
pebble is expected to reach an average burnup of 90,000 MWd/tU.
22
 Unlike the PBMR, 
the HTR-PM does not contain a central column of solid graphite, this space is filled with 
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additional fuel pebbles. In the outer reflector of the HTR-PM there are eight control 
rods, channels for reserve shutdown, and helium coolant channels.
22
  
 
2.3 Safeguards at Pebble-fueled HTGRs 
2.3.1 Safeguards Requirements 
 The pebble-fueled HTGR falls into a category of safeguards requirements for 
“Other Types of Reactors.” These requirements only apply to reactors located in 
countries that have concluded an INFCIRC/153-type CSA with the IAEA.
9
 For the full 
text of requirements, refer to the IAEA Safeguards Manual. What follows is a summary 
of these requirements as they would apply to a pebble-fueled HTGR:
9
  
 All records and reports at a facility are examined to ensure correctness and 
internal facility consistency in reporting methods. This examination is carried out 
during and after inspections at a facility in such a way that when the material 
balance period is closed, all relevant records and reports have been examined. 
These records and reports consist of facility records on inventory changes and 
material balance records.  
 Each calendar year, at a reactor facility, the IAEA will carry out a physical 
inventory verification (PIV) of a physical inventory taking that was performed by 
the operator of the reactor.  
o During the PIV, fresh fuel assemblies are item counted and verified by 
serial number identification. If identification by serial number is not 
possible, gross defects in the quantity of fuel must be verified to a 
specified detection probability. Additional requirements apply if the fuel 
is a mixed oxide fuel (MOX) or highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. 
o For fuel that may reside in an area of the reactor system that the IAEA 
designates “difficult-to-access” different requirements apply. These 
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requirements include applying dual containment and surveillance (C/S) 
measures
2
 to prevent any unknown removal of fuel.  
o Any spent fuel that has been discharged from the reactor must be 
maintained under C/S measures, then counted and verified accordingly. 
C/S measures in place are evaluated and if necessary, the spent fuel is 
item counted.  
o In the case of fuel assemblies that have been shipped between facilities 
within a country or between countries, the assemblies must be item 
counted and verified by serial number identification. If identification by 
serial number is not possible, gross defects in the quantity of fuel must be 
verified to a specified detection probability.  
o If spent fuel is transferred out of a facility or moved between material 
balance areas (MBAs) within a facility, but will be “difficult-to-access”, 
the container of spent fuel must be placed under dual C/S measures. Spent 
fuel discharged from a pebble-fueled HTGR would fall under this 
“difficult-to-access” category. 
o Fuel that is moved into and out of “difficult-to-access” areas, or other 
strategic points in a reactor facility, is again item counted and its 
identification verified by the necessary means. Depending on the storage 
status of the fuel, a dual C/S measure may be necessary.  
o The IAEA will also compare the records of transfers of fuel material 
between facilities. 
 While the IAEA does visit each reactor facility at least once a year to perform a 
PIV, the IAEA will also conduct inspections between PIVs. During these interim 
inspections: 
                                                          
2
 As defined in IAEA Safeguards Glossary
23
: “in a dual C/S system, each plausible diversion path is 
covered by two C/S measures that are functionally independent and are not subject to a common 
tampering or failure mode.” An example of such a system would be when a container is sealed with two 
different types of tamper indicating devices (TIDs) or the container is sealed and placed under video 
surveillance. 
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 Facility records are examined and the amount of material present at the facility 
since the PIV is updated. This allows the IAEA to examine material flow through 
a facility between PIVs.  
 Fuel present in the facility is also item counted and the identity of randomly 
chosen fuel material is verified. If material is under any type of C/S measure, the 
C/S system is evaluated to ensure its performance.
9
  
 At any point during PIVs or interim inspections, the IAEA must meet various 
timeliness goals in making the determination if a diversion of more than one significant 
quantity (SQ) of material has occurred. These timeliness goals vary for different types of 
nuclear material.
9
 A significant quantity is “the approximate amount of nuclear material 
for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be 
excluded.”23 To determine what an SQ of material is, materials are classified as: direct or 
indirect use. Direct use material is “nuclear material that can be used for the manufacture 
of nuclear explosive devices” without having to be placed into a reactor or further 
enriched.
23
 Indirect material is simply any nuclear material that is not direct use that 
requires additional processing before the material can be considered direct use.
23
 When 
determining the timeliness goal, direct use material can be further classified as irradiated 
or unirradiated. Examples of direct and indirect use material and the SQ for each 
material can be found in Table I.  
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Table I. IAEA specified direct and indirect use materials and the respective SQ of 
material.
23
 
Material SQ
Pu
a
8 kg Pu
233
U 8 kg 
233
U
HEU (
235
U ≥ 20%) 25 kg 
235
U
75 kg 
235
U
(or 10 t natural U or 20 t depleted U)
Th 20 t Th
Direct use nuclear material
Indirect use nuclear material
U (
235
U < 20%)
b
 
       
a
 For Pu containing less than 80% 
238
Pu 
       
b
 Including low enriched, natural, and depleted uranium 
 
The timeliness goals for detection of the diversion of 1 SQ of these materials are: 
one month for unirradiated direct use material; three months for irradiated direct use 
material; and one year for indirect use material.
23
 The timeliness goals set the interim 
inspection frequencies for the IAEA. For fresh fuel that contains low enriched uranium, 
the inspection frequency is yearly. In the case of fresh fuel that contains plutonium or 
HEU, an interim inspection is carried out monthly. In the case of low enriched uranium 
fuel currently in the core and spent fuel storage, the inspections are carried out once per 
quarter.  
The IAEA also performs a design verification of each facility. Typically, the 
IAEA is notified when a country decides to build a nuclear facility. As the design, 
planning, and construction of the facility progress, the IAEA will inspect the facility to 
verify that the facility has been built to the specifications the agency received. The 
facility design information is reviewed at least once a year to: determine if any 
undeclared modifications have been made to the facility, apply developments that have 
been made in safeguards technology, or apply experience gained in verification 
procedures.
9
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2.3.2 Proposed Safeguards Approaches for a Pebble-fueled HTGR 
The safeguards approach to satisfy the previously listed requirements for the 
HTR-10, as developed by the PRC and the IAEA, is not publicly available. However, 
work has been performed to develop a safeguards system for the PBMR design.  
2.3.2.1     Dual C/S Dependent Safeguards Approach 
Similar to an early approach developed for the THTR
24
, today the most often 
referenced safeguards approach for the PBMR was developed by PBMR (Pty) Ltd.
25
 
Since little differs about the reactor core and fuel utilized for the pebble-fueled HTGRs 
described, the same safeguards approach is applicable to all pebble-fueled HTGRs.  
The goal of this safeguards system - as with any safeguards system - is to provide 
a way to independently verify the total amount of nuclear material present at the PBMR, 
as well as, the amount of material present within any specified MBA of the reactor. This 
approach relies upon the PBMR core being designated as “difficult-to-access” by the 
IAEA because once a fuel pebble has been inserted into the core, direct access to a 
specific fuel pebble is not possible. This means the safeguards system will use dual C/S 
measures and item counting, not item verification, to safeguard the PBMR.  
Once per year a PIV will be carried out by the IAEA, at which point:
26
  
 accounting and operating records will be examined for correctness and 
consistency;  
 all C/S measures in place at the facility will be evaluated to ensure proper 
performance;  
 fuel pebble flow monitoring measures will be evaluated; 
 all shipments and receipts of nuclear material within and outside the facility will 
be verified; 
 environmental samples will be taken from locations throughout the facility; 
 design information will be verified; and 
 any nuclear material present at the reactor facility will be verified.  
 A fuel pebble, and maintaining continuous knowledge of its location, is in large 
part how the nuclear material present at the reactor is verified. This proposed system is 
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depicted in Fig. 3. In the figure, each step in the following description of the material 
flow, and the safeguards measures at each step, is designated by the letter a letter A 
through H.  
 Fresh fuel pebbles are stored in large containers that can hold 1000 pebbles. Each 
container is sealed and item counted. Randomly, containers of fresh fuel are selected and 
the presence of nuclear material is confirmed using a non-destructive assay (NDA) 
method that meets a specified detection probability. From fresh fuel storage, the pebble 
passes through a pebble counter (Fuel Flow Monitor) and the containment structure 
before entering the reactor core. Once a fuel pebble enters the core, the pebble cannot be 
counted or verified until removed later. Verification of fuel when in-core is achieved 
through evaluation of the dual C/S measures on all access points to the core and item 
counting of pebbles entering and exiting the core. Once a pebble is removed by the core 
unloading device, the pebble passes through the containment structure and into a fuel 
sorting machine. Damaged pebbles are removed and stored in a container within the core 
unloading device. This container of damaged pebbles is sealed with a TID, under video 
surveillance, and NDA measurements are taken to verify the presence of nuclear 
material. The material in this container is removed during maintenance and placed into a 
high-level waste storage area. Undamaged pebbles are identified as a fuel pebble or a 
graphite pebble. For fuel pebbles, their burnup is determined. If the fuel pebble can still 
be utilized in the reactor, the fuel pebble is counted and sent back into the core. If the 
fuel pebble has reached the desired burnup, the pebble is counted and sent to a spent fuel 
storage area for the remaining life of the reactor. Depending on the current operating 
status of the reactor core, graphite pebbles can be counted and sent back into the reactor 
core, or counted and sent to a storage area for later use. Fuel and graphite pebbles can 
also be removed after identification for a post-irradiation examination (PIE) in a secured 
location. Fuel pebbles not removed for a PIE pass into a temporary storage area where 
each is placed inside a large container. Once the container is full, the container is sealed 
with a TID and placed in long-term storage under video surveillance. 
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Fig. 3: Proposed dual C/S dependent safeguards system for the PBMR.
20
  
 
 As the pebbles are moved around the reactor system, access points to the various 
areas (e.g. core containment, PIE room, spent fuel storage areas) are sealed with tamper 
indicating devices (TIDs) and are under constant video surveillance. The data from these 
surveillance cameras and pebble counters are sent to an instrumentation room or cabinet 
with access limited to the IAEA. This room or cabinet is sealed with a TID and under 
constant video surveillance.
20,26
 This approach plans to utilize unattended or remote 
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monitoring of the surveillance and pebble flow systems.
26
 Since the TIDs and video 
surveillance used in this approach are “functionally independent and not subject to a 
common tampering or failure mode,” this proposed system satisfies the dual C/S 
measures condition of a “difficult-to-access” core.9,23 Should one system fail, it is 
expected that the other system would continue to operate, thereby preventing loss of 
continuity of knowledge (CoK) of pebble location. This safeguards approach also draws 
a safeguards conclusions through random unannounced inspections and complementary 
access to all facilities located on the reactor site. These unannounced inspections are 
carried out in the same manner as the interim inspections with examination of records, 
random verification and identification of nuclear material present at the site, and 
evaluation of any C/S measures in use.
26
  
2.3.2.2     Hybrid Safeguards Approach 
Since the pebble-fueled HTGR is a reactor type not commonly safeguarded by 
the IAEA, some researchers have determined that a new safeguards approach must be 
developed for this “new” reactor type.  
This line of thought has resulted in a hybrid safeguards approach that uses 
traditional reactor safeguards methods and safeguards methods commonly applied at 
bulk-type material facilities. This approach argues that these methods can be combined 
because the fuel pebbles are indistinguishable, sufficiently small in size, and large in 
number that the pebble-fueled HTGR is more similar to a bulk-type material facility than 
item-type material facility.
27
 This hybrid method is depicted in Fig. 4.  
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Fig. 4. Hybrid safeguards approach for a pebble-fueled HTGR.
28
  
 
To use item- and bulk-type material accounting methods, multiple material 
balance areas (MBAs) must be established inside the reactor facility. This is unlike 
traditional LWR safeguards where the entire reactor facility is traditionally placed inside 
a single MBA.  
The first MBA is placed around the fresh fuel storage area. Here the fuel is stored 
in large containers that are item counted. A serial number is placed on each container. 
This allows for random identity verification of containers of pebbles. Each container is 
also weighed to verify the approximate quantity of pebbles in the container. From this, 
the approximate amount of nuclear material can be estimated. The content of these 
containers are also verified using gross radiation attribution. This means that an NDA 
measurement is taken to verify the height of pebbles in each container. Comparing this 
approximate height to previous height estimations will reveal if large quantities of 
pebbles have been removed and changes in the overall radiation signature of the 
container can revel if pebbles in the container have been replaced. As pebbles are 
removed from these large containers and sent into the reactor core, each pebble is 
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counted. When the pebbles enter the reactor core, the pebbles enter a bulk-type material 
MBA.  
As the reactor operates, the nuclear production and loss in the reactor core can be 
simulated using information provided about operating power records and pebble quantity 
from pebble counters.  
When pebbles exit the reactor core, each pebble is counted and passed into 
another item-type material MBA. This MBA is a temporary spent fuel storage area 
where the pebbles are again placed into a large container. Once full, the container is 
sealed with a TID. Like the containers in fresh fuel storage, each container is marked 
with a serial number, is weighed, and its contents are verified using gross radiation 
attribution before being placed in long-term storage. By storing fuel pebbles in large 
containers, the amount of effort needed to determine the amount of nuclear material 
present is reduced. Each drum can be counted instead of attempting to count each 
pebble. As long as the IAEA has already verified the contents of each drum, only the 
TIDs and serial numbers on randomly chosen drums need to be verified during 
subsequent inspections. In addition to these item- and bulk-type material safeguards 
measures, C/S measures would also be utilized throughout the facility to supplement the 
safeguards system. 
2.3.3 Challenges with Proposed Safeguards Approaches for Pebble-fueled HTGR 
There are two vulnerabilities identified in the proposed safeguards approaches 
for the pebble-fueled HTGR: maintenance of continuity of knowledge (CoK) and the 
introduction of material unaccounted for (MUF).  
In the safeguards approach proposed by PBMR (Pty) Ltd. that was described in 
Section 2.3.2.1, maintenance of CoK cannot be demonstrated in scenarios when C/S 
measures have failed, or are purposely compromised. Item counting could be used to 
restore some knowledge of core contents; however, experiences at the HTR-10 have 
proven that even these counters cannot be relied upon to accurately determine the 
quantity of pebbles present in the core.
27
 Additionally, if an adversary were to replace 
the quantity of removed pebbles with borrowed pebbles, or pebbles that were produced 
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at an undeclared facility, item counting would not detect this diversion. In the hybrid 
approach, if the reactor core were emptied and C/S measures were not operable, 
operation of the bulk-type material measurement system, primarily the weighing system 
for storage containers, must remain uncompromised in order for CoK to be maintained. 
If at any point the bulk-type material measurement systems were inoperable, an 
adversary could remove pebbles, and replace the pebbles with borrowed material to 
carry out a diversion. 
Uncertainty found with item counting and bulk-type material measurement 
systems, generate material unaccounted for (MUF) into the safeguards approach for a 
pebble-fueled HTGR. In a facility, MUF is mathematically determined from quantities 
obtained by measurement techniques that have some uncertainty in their measurements. 
As MUF is calculated, this uncertainty is propagated until a total uncertainty in MUF is 
determined. This uncertainty in MUF, if large due to poor measurement accuracy or 
measurement/counting system manipulation, can be used by an adversary to divert 
material.  
These vulnerabilities in proposed approaches identify the hurdle that must be 
overcome to safeguard a pebble-fueled HTGR: the ability to verify the unique identity of 
each fuel pebble. Safeguards requirements, as outlined in Section 2.3.1, repeatedly 
reflect the necessity to verify the identity of each pebble passing through the reactor 
system. If each fuel pebble identity can be verified, when C/S measures are inoperable 
CoK can be restore and there would be a zero MUF in the facility. 
Although work has been performed to demonstrate the difficulty and expense 
associated with reprocessing of diverted fuel pebbles
29,30
 and the large quantity of fuel 
pebbles necessary to divert a SQ of material
3
, this work does not directly address the 
need to uniquely identify each pebble in a pebble-fueled HTGR. As such, the focus of 
this safeguards system concept is to develop and evaluate a system to uniquely identify 
each fuel pebble. Identification of each fuel pebble would firmly place the pebble-fueled 
HTGR as an item-type material facility family, increasing the difficulty for an adversary 
                                                          
3
 1 SQ LEU = 86,000 LEU fresh fuel pebbles; 1 SQ Pu = 52,000 LEU spent fuel pebbles (Durst et. al.27). 
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to divert material undetected. As such, safeguards approaches at different types of item-
type material reactors would be applicable to this concept. 
 
2.4 Safeguards Approaches at Different Types of Reactors 
2.4.1 Light Water Reactors 
There are 442 nuclear reactors currently operating in the world.
31
 Of these 
operating reactors, the majority are light water reactors (LWRs). This reactor type is 
comprised of two general designs: pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water 
reactors (BWRs). Due to the large number of LWR facilities, LWRs are the most 
common reactor type safeguarded by the IAEA. LWRs, like most reactors, are 
considered item-type material facilities because the fuel is maintained in distinguishable 
fuel assemblies and fuel pins.
23
 This “item” designation is what the safeguards approach 
for a LWR is built.  
2.4.1.1     Operation of a LWR 
LWRs operate on the same principle as a pebble-fueled HTGR. Unlike the 
pebble-fueled HTGR, a LWR uses meters long fuel assemblies that are comprised of 
fuel pins that contain the fuel material. In a PWR, this heat is transferred to a light water 
coolant, and then transferred to another water cycle to create steam. The steam drives a 
turbine attached to a generator to produce electricity.
33
  In a BWR, the heat generated by 
the fuel is cooled by water that is directly converted to steam inside the reactor vessel.
32
 
This generation process for a PWR can be seen in Fig. 5.  
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Fig. 5. Flow diagram for a PWR.
33
 
 
To maintain the electricity generation process, the fuel in the reactor core must 
be replaced at regular intervals. This spent fuel typically comprises one-third of a reactor 
core. When spent fuel is replaced, the reactor is shutdown and the cover of the reactor 
vessel is removed using a large crane. Spent fuel is removed from the reactor core and 
transferred to an open spent fuel storage pond. Once the spent fuel has been removed, 
fresh fuel is inserted into the reactor core from an open storage pool. When all of the 
fresh fuel has been loaded, the reactor vessel cover is returned.  
2.4.1.2      Safeguarding a LWR 
Light water reactors are designed to store spent fuel inside or outside of reactor 
containment. In LWRs with spent fuel storage within containment, a single C/S measure 
(e.g. video surveillance) is used to monitor the area within containment. Safeguards 
measures implemented at this type of facility can be seen in Fig. 6.  
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Fig. 6. Safeguards measures at a LWR with spent fuel storage inside containment.
34
 
 
In a reactor design where the spent fuel storage pond is located outside of the 
containment structure, there are at least two C/S measures in place (e.g. surveillance of 
the spent fuel storage pool and surveillance of the reactor vessel). Implementation of 
safeguards measures for this type of LWR can be seen in Fig. 7. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Safeguards measures at a LWR with spent fuel storage outside containment.34 
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 Although spent fuel location can change depending on the design, all LWRs still 
utilize similar measures to safeguard their nuclear material. These measures are:8
,34 
 Placement of a seal on the cover of the reactor vessel. To access core fuel, the 
reactor vessel cover must be removed. By placing a seal on the cover the IAEA 
can verify any access against facility records to determine why the cover was 
removed. The IAEA can then review video surveillance to determine if fuel was 
removed during that access.  
 Each fuel assembly and fuel pin is engraved with a unique serial number during 
manufacturing. When fuel assemblies are transferred between facilities and 
within the reactor facility, the assemblies are counted and the identity of 
randomly chosen fuel assemblies is verified by the serial number.  
 Seals are applied to shipping containers for fresh fuel and any storage containers 
for spent fuel. The seal must be removed in order to open the containers. The 
IAEA can then verify this access against facility records and review video 
surveillance.  
 The reactor crane used to move fuel assemblies and the reactor vessel cover is 
also utilized in safeguarding a LWR. A seal can be placed on a key component of 
the crane such that operation could not occur without removal of the seal.  
 The reactor core, storage areas, and reactor crane are monitored by video 
surveillance.  
 The canal that connects the fuel storage pool to the core is lined with detector 
systems. When radiation is detected, video surveillance will activate allowing the 
IAEA to determine the number of fuel assemblies moved and where the 
assemblies were transferred. The IAEA can also verify the identity of the fuel 
assembly if the system is setup to capture images of each assembly serial 
number.  
 In the spent fuel storage pool, visibility through water allows the IAEA to use a 
Cerenkov Viewing Device to verify that spent fuel assemblies have not been 
replaced with fake assemblies or fresh fuel assemblies.  
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 The IAEA less frequently uses facility operating records and fuel manufacturing 
records to simulate the burn of core fuel. When the fuel is removed, the IAEA 
can use various types of detectors to verify the fission product content of the 
spent fuel against the simulation to ensure that there was no undeclared 
operations at the facility. 
 The IAEA verifies these safeguards measures at LWRs quarterly, or once every 
three months. These measures are also verified yearly during the PIV.  
2.4.2 On-load Fueled Reactors 
On-load fueled reactors refer to reactor types that are refueled while the reactor is 
operating. The most common reactor designs of this type are CANada Deuterium 
Uranium (CANDU) reactors and Magnox reactors. There are currently no plans for 
additional Magnox reactors to be built, however there are plans for additional CANDU 
reactors and a similar style reactor built by The Republic of India.  The CANDU reactor 
is the most commonly safeguarded on-load refueled reactor, as such the CANDU will 
serve as the reference facility.  
2.4.2.1     Operation of On-load Fueled Reactors 
 The operating principles of a CANDU reactor are similar to LWRs. A flow 
diagram of a CANDU facility can be seen in Fig. 8. Heat is generated by fission of low 
enriched uranium in fuel bundles. This heat is transferred to water that generates steam 
in a secondary cycle. The steam drives a turbine that is attached to a generator. However, 
there are several differences between a CANDU and LWR:
35
  
 the reactor vessel of a CANDU is oriented horizontally instead of vertically;  
 the fuel bundles are placed in fuel channels that penetrate the reactor vessel from 
end to end;  
 a CANDU uses heavy water (D2O) to moderate neutrons and cool the fuel 
bundles (in the most recent design, the Advanced CANDU, D2O is placed inside 
the reactor vessel to moderate neutrons, while light water (H2O) is placed in the 
fuel channels to cool the fuel assemblies);  
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 the fuel assemblies are considerably smaller (approximately 0.5 m in length) than 
a typical LWR fuel assembly; and 
 natural uranium is used instead of low enriched uranium (in the Advanced 
CANDU, varying low enrichments of uranium are used in a single fuel bundle). 
 The CANDU operates by placing several fuel bundles in each of the hundreds of 
fuel channels. Once a fuel bundle has reached the desired burnup, the bundle is pushed 
out one end of the reactor vessel and a fresh fuel bundle is added to the fuel channel. 
This action is performed by a fuel handling machine that simultaneously inserts the fresh 
fuel bundle, while removing the spent fuel bundle. The fresh fuel is taken from a fresh 
fuel storage area and loaded into the fuel handling machine. Spent fuel bundles that have 
been removed are placed in a spent fuel storage bay.
35
  
 
 
Fig. 8. Flow diagram for an Advanced CANDU reactor.
36
 
 
2.4.2.2     Safeguards for CANDU Reactor 
Depending on the equipment available at the time and the safeguards agreement 
between the IAEA and the State, the safeguards measures used to maintain CoK at a 
CANDU-type facility may be different. One method to maintain CoK relies upon video 
surveillance of the fuel bundle flow paths. The implementation of the safeguards 
measures can be seen in Fig. 9. An additional method to maintain CoK on the pebble 
flow paths is to mount a neutron and gamma radiation detector above each end of the 
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reactor core. Implementation of safeguards measures using this core discharge monitor 
can be seen in Fig. 10. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Implementation of safeguards measures at a CANDU facility using video 
surveillance and radiation monitors.34  
 
  
Fig. 10. Implementation of safeguards measures at a CANDU facility using core 
discharge monitor.34 
 
 The CANDU presents an interesting challenge to safeguards for a reactor 
because the reactor has characteristics like a LWR and a pebble-fueled HTGR. Like a 
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LWR, use of easily distinguishable fuel bundles makes item counting and identity 
verification possible. However, the reactor vessel is penetrated by hundreds of fuel 
channels. Each channel has fuel being inserted and withdrawn, meaning there is not a 
single reactor vessel cover that would have to be sealed, but hundreds. Similar to a 
pebble-fueled HTGR, once a fuel bundle has been placed inside a fuel channel, the 
bundle cannot be physically seen until the bundle has been removed on the other end of 
the fuel channel. Furthermore, CANDU fuel is discharged as spent fuel at a much lower 
burnup than LWR or pebble-fueled HTGR fuel. This results in a spent fuel bundle with a 
plutonium content more desirable to an adversary. As such, the safeguards measures 
focus on the spent fuel bundles. CANDUs still rely upon similar safeguards measures as 
a LWR, but applied differently. Safeguards measures utilized at a CANDU:
8,37
 
 Fuel bundles are manufactured with serial numbers and shipped in sealed 
containers.  
 When fresh fuel is brought into the reactor facility, the bundles are placed in 
storage before being loaded into the fuel handling system. Bundles are loaded 
under constant video surveillance.  
 The fuel handling machines are controlled remotely and semi-automated. Each 
machine is under constant video surveillance. 
 Spent fuel bundles are remotely transferred to the storage bay. The transfer path 
is under video surveillance.  
 As the bundles pass through the containment structure, detectors use the radiation 
emitted to count the number of bundles that pass.  
 Once the bundles enter the storage area, radiation detectors are again used to 
monitor movement within the storage area, as well as video surveillance.  
 As depicted in Fig. 10, video surveillance of transfer paths can be replaced with a 
core discharge monitor. This monitor is capable of detecting the characteristic variations 
in gamma and neutron radiation emitted when the fuel channels are opened and closed 
for loading and unloading of fuel. This distinct variation in the amount of radiation 
emitted is used to count the number of bundles inserted or removed. The IAEA also uses 
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this radiation to verify the flow of the fuel bundles through the fuel handling machines, 
unlike when C/S measures monitor flow by monitoring access to the handling machines. 
 The increased focus on spent fuel is important because the more desirable spent 
fuel bundles accumulate quickly. Instead of counting and verifying the identity of each, 
the bundles are loaded into large storage racks. Once a rack is full, a seal is applied. 
Now, instead of counting and verifying hundreds of fuel bundles, the IAEA can count 
the full racks and verify the integrity of the seals. Additionally, like LWRs, the coolant 
visibility allows use of a Cerenkov Viewing Device to determine if fuel present in the 
storage racks has been irradiated or replaced with dummy bundles. Additionally, a 
radiation detector can be lowered into the spent fuel area during IAEA inspections to 
verify the authenticity of the spent fuel. 
 Although there is an increased focus on the spent fuel present at a CANDU 
facility, the interim inspection frequency is three months, in addition to a yearly PIV. 
2.4.3 Fast Reactors 
Fast reactors use a liquid metal as the coolant. This liquid metal is typically 
sodium or lead, or some alloy of sodium or lead. While almost fifty experimental, 
demonstration, and commercial fast reactor facilities have been built across the world, 
very few have been under full scope IAEA safeguards. As such, of all reactor types, the 
IAEA has the least amount of safeguards experience with commercial fast reactors.  
2.4.3.1     Operation of Fast Reactors 
Fast reactors operate on the same principle as the other reactors considered. The 
nuclear fuel generates heat that is transferred to the liquid metal coolant. This coolant 
then transfers the heat to additional cycles that eventually drive a turbine. Different 
between fast reactors and LWRs is the type of fuel assembly used. LWRs typically use 
low-enriched uranium in slightly varying enrichments. In fast reactors some assemblies 
contain large quantities of plutonium, while some primarily contain depleted uranium. 
The fresh fuel assemblies contain the most plutonium; as such, fresh fuel is the focus of 
the safeguards approach. The most safeguarded fast reactor is the sodium cooled fast 
reactor; this design will serve as the reference facility.   
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2.4.3.2     Safeguarding Fast Reactors 
Fast reactors are treated as item-type material facilities. The largest difficulty in 
safeguarding a fast reactor is the opaque nature of the coolant and the large amount of 
plutonium in some assemblies. Thus, the approach primarily relies upon item counting 
and extensive C/S measures to maintain CoK. 
The facility layout and implemented safeguards measures at the MONJU 
sodium-cooled fast reactor located in Japan can be seen in Fig. 11. The safeguards 
measures utilized are:
8,38
  
 Fresh fuel assemblies arrive at the reactor facility in sealed cans. The cans are 
unloaded into a fresh fuel storage pit. Fresh fuel assemblies that contain the large 
quantities of plutonium are unloaded to the storage pit in the presence of an 
IAEA inspector. This storage pit is under dual C/S measures. 
 Fuel to be loaded into the reactor is unloaded in the fresh fuel handling room. As 
the assembly leaves the fuel handling room to enter the reactor, the assembly 
passes an Entrance Gate Monitor (ENGM). The monitor uses an NDA system to 
count each assembly and to determine the type of assembly that is being 
transferred.   
 Each fuel assembly is loaded into the reactor core by a series of remotely 
controlled machines. After passing the ENGM, the assembly is placed into the 
Ex-Vessel Transfer Machine (EVTM). Here, radiation monitors are again used to 
count and verify the fuel assembly type.  
 The EXTM then transfers the assembly to the Ex-Vessel Storage Tank (EVST). 
In the EVST, each assembly is immersed in the sodium coolant. Radiation 
monitors (EVST Monitors) line the tank to count each assembly, verify assembly 
type, and determine direction of movement in or out of the reactor vessel. 
 Once in the reactor core, an internal transfer machine is used to place each 
assembly. The Radiation Power Monitor (RPM) is similar in function and 
purpose to the EVST Monitors but tracks fuel movement inside the reactor 
vessel. 
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 Once the fuel has been placed inside the reactor core, the assemblies are 
inaccessible. Thus, seals and video surveillance are used to ensure there is no 
undeclared removal of fuel from the reactor core.  
 When fuel assemblies are removed from the reactor core, the assemblies travel 
through the EVST. The EVST then transfers the assemblies into a spent fuel 
cleaning and canning station.  
 Once cleaned and dried, the fuel assembly is placed into a can. When fuel 
assemblies have been removed from the core and cleaned, verification of the 
serial number is possible, but not heavily relied upon because the serial number 
could not be verified when the assembly was in the core.  
 The spent fuel storage can is then sealed, the transferred through an Exit Gate 
Monitor (EXGM). This monitor is similar in function and purpose to the ENGM, 
but instead monitors the flow of assemblies into the spent fuel storage pit.  
 Once placed in the spent fuel storage pit, the can is placed under video 
surveillance. 
 Fuel assemblies that originally contained only depleted uranium, now contain 
some amount of plutonium usable in more reactor fuel. These assemblies are 
placed into sealed shipping containers and sent to a reprocessing plant. 
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Fig. 11. Primary safeguards measures at MONJU Fast Reactor in Japan.38  
 
Since there are large quantities of plutonium in fresh fuel assemblies, the fresh 
fuel is considered unirradiated direct use material. Thus, fast reactors are inspected 
monthly in addition to the yearly PIV. 
2.4.4 Review of Item-based Approach for Pebble-fueled HTGR Safeguards System 
Concept 
This review of safeguards approaches at different types of reactors demonstrated 
a wide definition of the item-based approach. The easiest reactor to safeguard was the 
LWR because the fuel assemblies are easily distinguishable, remain visible throughout 
the reactor facility, and can be marked with a serial number. The limitation of visibility 
of assemblies while in the core is overcome by placing a seal on the core cover to 
indicate any access.  
On-load fueled reactors are similar to pebble-fueled HTGRs since fuel is added 
to the reactor while operating. However, on-load reactors utilize fuel bundles that are 
still fairly physically distinguishable for item counting and can be marked with serial 
numbers. Like pebble-fueled HTGRs, once the fuel is inserted into fuel channels, the 
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bundles are inaccessible. This was overcome by increasing the number of C/S measures 
applied in the safeguards approach.  
The safeguards approach for fast reactors is very similar to the approach for on-
load fueled reactors. Item counting and extensive C/S measures are used to ensure no 
diversion of fuel assemblies. However, fast reactor safeguards had to overcome the 
additional challenge that the opaque coolant prevents direct verification of serial 
numbers when fuel assemblies are submerged. Additionally, spent fuel assemblies are 
stored in cans that prevent their visual verification. Nonetheless, should the fuel 
assemblies ever be removed from the coolant or storage can, the serial number on each 
assembly can still be used to restore continuity of knowledge.  
The review of these approaches furthers the notion that any approach for a 
pebble-fueled HTGR should be item-based. While item verification may not be heavily 
relied upon, like with on-load fueled reactors and fast reactors, the availability of identity 
verification supplemented by item counting and C/S measures increases the difficulty for 
an adversary to unknowingly divert nuclear material from the reactor facility.  
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3. DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM CONCEPT 
 
3.1 Potential Methods to Uniquely Identify Individual Pebbles 
To develop methods to identify the fuel pebbles, we first considered the 
placement of the identifier wither within the pebble (internal) or on the outside of the 
pebble (external).  
3.1.1 External Identifier 
The external identifier addressed is a serial number that is commonly applied as 
an identifier to item materials like the fuel present in a LWR, on-load fueled reactor, or 
fast reactor. This serial number would be engraved in the graphite that comprises the 
non-fueled region of the pebble, after the fuel pebble has been fully manufactured. 
Any concern of the neutronics affects of removing some amount of the graphite 
reflector due to engraving would be minimal because the quantity of graphite removed 
would be low compared to the total graphite present in a fuel pebble. An additional 
concern is how the engraving of serial number would affect the structural integrity of the 
pebble. As the pebble moves down the reactor core in-contact with other fuel pebbles 
and core components, the edges created by the engraving make the location a likely spot 
for damage to occur. This could result in loss of the serial number or a complete failure 
of the pebble fuel.  
By far, the greatest concern with any type of external identifier would be the ease 
with which the identifier could be reproduced. While the idea of a serial number is 
simple and easily verifiable, that is also a vulnerability to the system. In LWRs this 
vulnerability is overcome with the use of C/S measures since the fuel assemblies in an 
LWR are quite large, thus one can be distinguished from the removal of another. As long 
as video surveillance of the reactor vessel and surrounding areas was not compromised, 
it would be quickly revealed if fuel assemblies were being diverted.  
3.1.2 Internal Identifier 
Concerns of pebble structural integrity and identifier reproducibility can be 
overcome with use of an internal identifier. The internal identifier conceived uses 
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microspheres, of similar size as TRISO particles, whose random placement within the 
fueled region of the pebble would act as a fingerprint for each pebble.  
During pebble manufacturing, these microspheres could be added to the graphite 
matrix mixture that contains the TRISO particles. Once the mixture is transferred to the 
pebble mold for pressing, the microspheres would be randomly distributed inside the 
pebble. A detailed flow chart for the production of the TRISO particles and fuel pebbles 
can be found in Appendix A. 
The microsphere material must be able to withstand the expected thermal and 
radiation environment, as well as not chemically react with the graphite matrix. The 
microspheres should have a minimal impact on the reactivity in the pebble, meaning the 
material chosen should have a small neutron absorption cross section so as not to disrupt 
the neutron flux thereby impacting reactor operation. Additionally, an imaging system 
must be found that can reliably locate microspheres inside each fuel pebble. This 
imaging system must be capable of imaging fresh fuel, core fuel, and spent fuel pebbles, 
otherwise this safeguards systems would not be able to maintain CoK. Reproducibility of 
the random location of microspheres would be very difficult for an adversary to repeat, 
further increasing the difficulty of an undetected diversion of material.  
 
3.2 Development of Internal Identifier 
To determine the material for the microspheres, consideration was given to two 
types of microspheres. First, a microsphere comprised of a material that once irradiated, 
would emit a specific gamma energy that would be detected using a radiation based 
imaging system. The second type of material considered, was an inert material that could 
be imaged using a non-radiation based imaging system. The radiation based systems 
considered for detecting the microspheres were computed tomography (CT) and single 
photon emission tomography (SPECT). The non-radiation based imaging system 
considered was ultrasound imaging. Other imaging systems could be used in the concept 
but these systems were considered the most likely to be successful.  
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3.2.1     Computed Tomography (CT) Imaging 
Computed tomography (CT) is traditionally used in the medical field on 
biological material. CT operates by using a collimated x-ray source located directly 
across from a series of detectors that rotate around the patient as the source is rotated. 
The source is exposed to a one “slice” of the patient at a time, producing a series of one-
dimensional projections (images) at different angles around the patient. This process 
continues until enough projections have been taken to produce a good spatial resolution 
close to 1 mm. Using computer software, these one-dimensional projections are 
combined to create a two-dimensional image of the patient’s body. This operating 
principle can be seen in Fig. 12. CT scanners used in most hospitals today are third 
generation scanners that operate in the 70-80 keV energy range.
39
  
 
 
Fig. 12. Operating principle of CT scanner. 
 
CT has been previously investigated for use in the nuclear industry:
40
  
 individual fuel pellets have been imaged to determine density gradients;  
 fuel samples from Unit 2 at Three Mile Island were examined after the accident 
to determine the degree of damage to the fuel; 
X-Ray source 
Series of detectors 
Object being imaged 
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 CANDU fuel bundles used in a simulated loss of coolant accident were examined 
to determine temperature and radiation damage; and 
 PWR assemblies have been examined to form a detailed analysis of materials and 
flaws in subassemblies. 
 If CT was used to image each pebble, the microspheres could be gamma emitting 
or inert because there is an exterior source that produces the x-rays necessary for 
imaging. However, there are two limitations to the use of CT for this approach. First, 
nuclear material is dense, much denser than the typical biological materials traditionally 
imaged using CT.
40
 This means the x-rays from the source are attenuated more. As such, 
the source must generate x-rays of high energy that can fully penetrate the object and be 
detected on the opposite side. An additional limitation is that the radiation emitted from 
irradiated pebbles can saturate the detectors in the scanner.
40
 Once a fuel pebble has been 
irradiated, the radiation emitted from the TRISO particles or any gamma emitting 
microspheres would likely saturate the detectors 70-80 keV operating range. Also, the 
detectors used in CT scanners cannot differentiate between the radiation emitted from 
the pebble from the x-rays emitted by the source. This would result in an inaccurate 
fingerprint for the pebble that could not be matched to the correct image. With a fuel 
pebble, these limitations of CT prevent the system from being a viable imaging system 
for this safeguards systems concept. 
3.2.2     Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT) Imaging 
Radiation emitted from irradiated fuel pebbles presented difficulties in the CT 
imaging process. To overcome the limitations of an imaging system that emits the 
radiation, a system that detects emitted radiation was considered. Locating radioactive 
source material within an object is the operating principle behind single photon emission 
computed tomography (SPECT). 
SPECT does not produce an image of tissue within a patient, but instead 
produces an image of the distribution of radiopharmaceuticals in that tissue. The 
radiopharmaceuticals, known as radiotracers, are typically gamma emitting isotopes that 
are produced by irradiating a stable element causing the element to transmute into the 
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gamma emitting isotope desired. Elements with isotopes used as radiotracers include 
technetium, gallium, thallium, xenon, indium, and iodine. Each has isotopes with half-
lives on the order of hours to days with gamma energies ranging from 70 to 400 keV. 
Much like CT, SPECT uses a series of gamma cameras to detect the gamma radiation 
emitted by the radiotracers to create two-dimensional images of the patient’s body. 
Unlike CT, the spatial resolution of SPECT cannot be improved by generating additional 
images, so a resolution of 1 cm is typical.
39
 
SPECT has been previously investigated for use in the nuclear industry to detect 
the removal of fuel rods in fresh and spent LWR fuel assemblies. A system was designed 
such that a fuel assembly that has been shortly cooled (3-4 weeks) is placed inside of a 
housing while still in the spent fuel pool. Inside this housing, several collimated 
detectors record the radiation emitted by the fuel assembly. The detectors are moved 
vertically along the fuel assembly, recording measurements at set intervals. The 
investigation concluded that SPECT could successfully be used to detect the removal or 
replacement of fuel pins from fuel assemblies without having to disassemble the fuel 
assembly.
41
  
In application with this developed safeguards system concept, if the microspheres 
in the fuel pebble were emitting gamma radiation, the microspheres could act as the 
radiotracer for use with SPECT. However, there would be a few issues.  
Imaging of fresh fuel pebbles is not possible because the gamma emitting 
“radiotracer” microspheres have not been irradiated, so no gamma radiation could be 
detected by the SPECT system. Once the fuel pebble has been irradiated the same 
limitations seen with CT arise. Much like CT, SPECT: 
 is incapable of differentiating between radiation emitted by the microspheres and 
radiation emitted by the irradiated fuel material;  
 is vulnerable to detector saturation from radiation emitted from irradiated fuel 
pebbles in its 70-400 keV operating range; 
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 has a poorer resolution than CT, meaning the microspheres would have to be 
physically larger than the TRISO particles due to the 1 cm resolution of a 
SPECT system; and  
 Lastly, the energy of the radiation released by the microspheres would have to be 
large enough that any attenuation caused by the dense fuel material could be 
overcome.  
 Taken together, these limitations prevent SPECT from being a viable imaging 
system this concept. While SPECT could determine the location of microspheres larger 
than 1 cm in diameter, this size microsphere is likely to disrupt the TRISO particle 
quantities, thus changing the fuel characteristics, an undesired outcome.   
3.2.3     Ultrasound Imaging 
By considering an imaging system that does not rely upon detection of emitted 
radiation, the problems associated with detector saturation and source differentiation can 
be overcome. The non-radiation based system considered for application in this 
developed safeguards system is ultrasound imaging.  
Ultrasound imaging operates by sending a short pulse of energy into the body 
using an ultrasound transducer. The transducer produces a narrow ultrasound beam that 
moves through the body as a pressure wave. When the wave encounters tissue surfaces, 
boundaries between tissues, or objects within the body, part of the wave energy is lost 
due to absorption or scattering.
39 The direction and magnitude of scattered waves is 
dependent upon the physical and acoustic properties of the scattering object.
39
 
Some of the waves backscatter, or scatter back towards the transducer. The 
transducer then acts as a receiver, converting the returning pressure waves into voltages 
that are amplified, filtered, and then converted into a digital signal. This concept is 
depicted in Fig. 13. An image can be constructed from this digital signal because the 
time delay between transmission of the pressure wave and its return is known, as well as 
the speed at which the wave travels. From these two values, the system can determine 
the depth of the boundary or object within the body. The transmission and receipt of the 
wave takes 100-300 microseconds. After the transducer has received all of the 
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backscattered waves from this initial wave, the narrow ultrasound beam is electronically 
directed adjacent to the initial wave. Depending on the ultrasound system, this is 
repeated some 64 to 256 times, each acquiring a line of the image. These lines are then 
compiled by the system to create an image of the body in tens of milliseconds.
39
 
 
 
Fig. 13. Basic operating principle for an ultrasound system.
39
 
 
Generally operating in the frequency range of 1-10 MHz, ultrasound imaging has 
been used in the medical field for many years. When possible, ultrasound is the preferred 
imaging method because ultrasound imaging is fast, with real time imaging capabilities 
and possesses a high intrinsic spatial resolution at high frequencies. Ultrasound imaging 
does have some limitations in that ultrasound wave transmission is greatly reduced in 
gases and differentiation between biological material boundaries is poor.
39
  
Within the nuclear industry, ultrasound systems are extensively used to measure 
the flow of liquids through pipes in nuclear reactors. In the area of nuclear safeguards, 
ultrasound imaging has been investigated for use in safeguarding in-core fuel at sodium 
fast reactors.
42
 As previously discussed in Section 2.4.3, once a fuel assembly has been 
placed in the opaque liquid metal coolant, no serial number can be visually read. 
However, by using an ultrasound system, the response of sound waves can be used to 
reconstruct an image of the serial number engraved on a fuel assembly. 
In this safeguards system concept, ultrasound imaging presents no immediately 
discernable limitations. Since ultrasound operates using mechanical properties of 
materials, and not nuclear properties of materials, an ultrasound system should be able to 
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image fresh, core, and spent fuel pebbles. This assumes that the ultrasound equipment 
itself has been radiation hardened or not affected by the radiation emitted from irradiated 
fuel pebbles. With an ultrasound system it is not necessary for the microspheres to emit 
radiation. This opens the options for materials that could be used for the microspheres.  
The major unknown about ultrasound imaging for this concept that could not be 
determined was the transmission behavior of ultrasound waves in graphite. However, it 
was established through experimentation. Other than the unknown transmission 
characteristics, since no conclusive disadvantages of ultrasound imaging could be 
demonstrated from literature, ultrasound imaging was chosen as the system to be used in 
this concept.  
3.2.4     Microsphere Material 
With the imaging system chosen, it was possible to determine the material for the 
microspheres. The field was quickly narrowed to ceramic materials due to their high 
temperature resistance. This is a desired characteristic because the pebble-fueled HTGR 
is a high temperature reactor, operating with a helium outlet temperature near 900
o
C.
18
 A 
ceramic microsphere is more likely to remain stable at these temperatures over the 
lifetime of the fuel pebble, as well as remain stable past 1600
o
, the temperature at which 
metallic fission products begin to diffuse through the SiC layer of the TRISO particle.
43
  
The two ceramics considered for the microsphere material were zirconium carbide (ZrC) 
and zirconium oxide (ZrO2).  
Both ZrC and ZrO2 have been investigated for use in nuclear reactors. Each are 
being considered as candidate materials for use in inert matrix fuels for LWRs and high 
temperature reactors to burn excess plutonium from fuel reprocessing and nuclear 
weapons.
44,45
 Additionally, ZrC is being considered for application in pebble fuel as a 
replacement for the SiC layer of the TRISO particle for improved fission product 
retention. ZrC has also been investigated as an additional layer around the fuel kernel to 
react with free oxygen to prevent failure of the TRISO particle due to fuel kernel 
migration.
46
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With regards to the microspheres proposed, ZrC and ZrO2 have melting 
temperatures of approximately 3500
o
C and 2700
o
C, respectively.
47
 These temperatures 
are well above the 1600
o
C fission product diffusion limit of SiC near  the 2800
o
C 
melting temperature of UO2.
48
 This means at very high temperatures, failure of the 
microspheres will not be of primary concern because prevention of a fuel failure would 
be more consequential.  
Either ZrC or ZrO2 can be used as the ceramic material for the microspheres 
imagined in this safeguards system concept. For this work, ZrO2 was chosen as the 
material for the microspheres. ZrO2 is not commonly used in a pure form, more often 
ZrO2 is doped with an additive that stabilizes the ZrO2 for use in a wider range of 
applications.
47
 For the microspheres considered in this concept the additive chosen was 
yttrium oxide (Y2O3).  
An additional ideal characteristic of ZrO2 is its low neutron absorption cross 
section. Fig. 14 shows a plot of the neutron absorption cross section of 
235
U, natural 
zirconium, natural yttrium (
89
Y), and carbon (
12
C) from Evaluated Nuclear Data File 
(ENDF) B Version VI.8. In Fig. 14, a line marks 0.025 eV, the average thermal neutron 
energy. At this energy, the absorption cross section for natural zirconium, 
89
Y, and 
12
C 
are very low compared to 
235
U. This means the probability that the microsphere will 
parasitically absorb a neutron is low compared to the probability that the fissionable 
235
U 
in each TRISO particle will absorb a neutron. 
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Fig. 14. Absorption cross section plot of 
235
U, natural zirconium, 
89
Y, and 
12
C. 
 
3.3     Implementation of the Developed System Concept 
 The fully developed system consists of 1 mm ZrO2 microspheres that have been 
randomly dispersed inside of each fuel pebble. The random configuration of these 
microspheres will be imaged using an ultrasound imaging system. For this safeguards 
system concept, the microspheres will be placed in the fueled region of each fuel pebble, 
meaning the microspheres will be dispersed among the TRISO particles. Consideration 
was given to placement of the microspheres in the non-fueled region of the pebble, but 
was decided against due to the unknown amount of the graphite shell that would be 
removed as each pebble circulated through the reactor core. 
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 This safeguards system concept would be implemented at the reactor facility in 
such a way that the microsphere fingerprint would be verified at key measurement points 
throughout the reactor system. These key measurement points are highlighted in red 
boxes in Fig. 15.  Use of this safeguards system concept does not replace the need of C/S 
measures. While the extensive C/S measures used the dual C/S dependent approach will 
probably not be necessary, some level of C/S protection will be required. The 
supplementation of C/S measures is necessary because of the lack of access to fuel 
pebbles for random verification when the pebbles are in the reactor core and fuel storage 
containers.  
 Most likely, this system can replace the functionality of the pebble counters 
utilized in previous approaches. The imaging of each pebble acts as a pebble counter, 
much like in CANDU safeguards when detection of radiation emitted from fuel bundles 
is used to count the number of bundles.  
 To prevent tampering, the ultrasound system will need to be sealed with a TID 
and possibly maintained under video surveillance. This judgment must be made by the 
agency utilizing the system to safeguard the reactor. An additional part of the 
determination will need to be the cost associated with implementation of this design. 
While ultrasound systems can be less expensive than other imaging systems considered 
in this research, the higher the resolution of the system needed, the larger the cost 
associated. For this research, these costs were not considered. 
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Fig. 15. Key measurement points where the developed safeguards system concept would 
be implemented at a pebble-fueled HTGR facility. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusions on the Development of the System Concept 
 The main challenge to safeguarding a pebble-fueled HTGR was identified as the 
current inability to restore continuity of knowledge (CoK) in situations where large 
quantities of pebbles are removed from the core and containment and surveillance (C/S) 
measures in place have failed or been purposely compromised. This challenge could be 
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overcome if a method were developed to uniquely identify each fuel pebble 
supplemented by C/S measures, much like the safeguards systems used at light water 
reactors, on-load fueled reactors, and fast reactors. Based on the pebble-fueled HTGR 
core environment and material challenges with the fuel pebbles, the best placement of an 
identifier for the system was determined to be inside the pebble. The identifying method 
chosen was the use of small microspheres that could be randomly distributed inside each 
fuel pebble to create a unique fingerprint for each pebble. To verify this internal 
identifier it was determined that an imaging system must be found that could operate in 
the presence of unirradiated and irradiated fuel pebbles. The imaging system most likely 
capable of imaging these types of pebbles was determined to be ultrasound imaging. 
Zirconium based ceramic materials were identified as the preferred material for the 
microspheres based on high temperature resistance and small thermal neutron absorption 
cross section. The final chosen material for this safeguards system concept was 
zirconium oxide with the additive yttrium oxide. Implementation of this concept was 
also considered. It was determined that the system would be placed at key measurement 
points in the reactor facility, replacing the functionality of pebble counters utilized in 
currently proposed approaches.  
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4. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM CONCEPT 
 
 For this statistical analysis, there are two questions that need to be answered: 
1. What is the minimum number of microspheres necessary to be able to uniquely 
identify some number of pebbles? 
2. What is the probability that one pebble will have a configuration that randomly 
matches another pebble? 
 
4.1  Total Number of Pebbles Passing Through the Reactor Core 
 The total number of pebbles that will pass through the reactor in its lifetime was 
determined. This number sets the lower limit for the total number of configurations of 
microspheres necessary. The total number of fuel pebbles in the reactor system was set 
to 520,000. This number corresponds to the number of pebbles found in the HTR-PM 
core when the reactor is operating at equilibrium. Several assumptions were made:
 49
 
1. the number of pebbles initially loaded into the reactor core will be the same as 
the number of pebbles in the equilibrium core; 
2. the initial load of pebbles remains in the core for three years before pebbles are 
permanently discharged; 
3. once equilibrium status has been reached, the average number of pebbles being 
discharged daily is 8036;  
4. on average, approximately 10% (803 pebbles) are permanently discharged daily 
as spent fuel and replaced with an equal number of fresh fuel pebbles, the 
remaining being recirculated back into the core; and 
5. the reactor is operating 365 days per year for its design lifetime of 40 years.  
 Using these assumptions, it is possible to determine the total number of pebbles 
the reactor will “see” in its lifetime: 
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In real world conditions this number would fluctuate due to the true number of pebbles 
in the initial core and the operating statistics of each reactor, such as capacity factor and 
availability factor. Additionally, this value corresponds to the number of pebbles that 
pass through a single reactor in its lifetime. When implemented, this total number of 
pebbles must at least be multiplied by at least the number of reactors in each country. 
To make simplify subsequent calculations, the number of pebbles seen in the 
reactor lifetime was rounded to 10,000,000 pebbles. This means that there must be at 
least 10,000,000 unique configurations of microspheres that can be used to identify a 
pebble.  
 
4.2 Minimum Number of Microspheres 
Consider a simple square divided into four smaller squares in Fig. 16. These 
squares are labeled 1, 2, 3 and 4. Assume a circle is placed in two of the four squares. 
 
    
Fig. 16. Graphical representation of one of the possible ways to fill a 2 by 2 set of 
squares with two circles.  
 
There are six, or configurations, that two squares can each be filled with one circle (1,2; 
1,3; 1,4; 2,3; 2,4 and 3,4). This total number of configurations can be analytically 
determined using the binomial coefficient,
50
 noted as  
 
 
 : 
 
 
 
 
  
  
        
    Eq. (1) 
 
1 2 
3 4 
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where, n is the number of objects and k is the number of chosen objects. In the case of 
the above example with the four squares and two circles, Eq. (1) would be: 
 
 
 
 
  
  
        
 
       
           
   
 
Using this same process, it is possible to determine the minimum number of 
microspheres necessary to create enough unique configurations of microspheres to 
identify at least 10,000,000 pebbles.  
We consider the number of possible positions in which microspheres can be 
placed must be determined. The microspheres will be placed in the fueled region of the 
pebble. the volume of this region is: 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
                       
 
Also present in this fueled region of the pebble are TRISO particles. The volume that 
these TRISO particles occupy must be removed because a microsphere cannot occupy 
the same volume as a TRISO particle.  
If the volume of all the TRISO particles was simply subtracted from the volume 
of the fueled region, this volume would not represent the volume available for a 
microsphere. Even if the entire fueled region of the pebble were occupied by TRISO 
particles, in reality there would be some volume that would not be occupied due to the 
lattice structure created by the TRISO particles. In 2D this principle can be seen in Fig. 
17, where the black region represents the area occupied by a TRISO particle and the 
crosshatch region represents the vacant area due to the nature of the lattice structure.  
 
  
 
51 
 
Fig. 17. Voxel created by each TRISO particle and microsphere. 
 
This crosshatch region must be accounted for in the volume calculation for a TRISO fuel 
particle. In reality, the TRISO particles could form a lattice structure that has a higher 
packing fraction. However, by using the structure in Fig. 17 the a larger volume will be 
attributed to each TRISO particle, meaning the volume available for the microspheres 
will be a conservative estimate.  
To account for this volume correction, the diameter of the TRISO particle is used 
as the side length of a cube around the TRISO particle. Thus, the volume of this TRISO 
voxel is: 
 
                     
            
 
The total volume of the fueled region of the pebble occupied by all 15,000 TRISO 
particle voxels is: 
 
                             
               
 
Subtracting this total TRISO particle volume from the volume of the fueled region, the 
remaining volume of the fueled region that can be occupied by the microspheres is: 
 
                         
                            
 
Applying the same lattice principle to the microspheres, the volume of a voxel 
created by a single microsphere is: 
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Dividing the remaining volume in the fueled region by the volume of the microsphere 
cube, the total number of positions a microsphere could occupy would be: 
 
                      
                 
  
            
      
          Eq. (2) 
 
These 53,769 voxels are the number of positions in the fueled region of the pebble 
available for a microsphere. Since a fraction of a microsphere cannot be placed inside 
one of these positions, the total number of voxels for microspheres was rounded down to 
the nearest integer. This total number of voxels should be considered an average value. 
In manufacturing processes, random differences in pebbles could increase or decrease 
the total number of positions possible in the fueled or non-fueled region.  
Now that the number of voxels that can be occupied by a microsphere has been 
determined, the binomial coefficient can be used to determine the number of unique 
configurations of microspheres as follows: 
 
 
      
 
  
       
             
     Eq. (3) 
 
where there are n (or 53,769) voxels to choose from and k voxels chosen to be filled with 
a microsphere. The simplest way to determine the lowest k is to begin at 1 and increase k 
by 1. When the number of unique configurations exceeds the lower limit of 10,000,000, 
the minimum number of microspheres necessary to uniquely identify each pebble has 
been found.  This is as follows: 
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For k=1 
 
      
 
  
       
         
 
      
 
                              
 
For k=2 
 
 
      
 
  
       
         
 
             
   
                                     
 
The lower limit is exceeded by randomly filling only two, of the 53,769 available 
positions with microspheres. This means that the minimum number of microspheres 
necessary to create enough unique configurations of microspheres to uniquely identify at 
least 10,000,000 pebbles is two. However, in application, to determine which voxel the 
microsphere has been placed in, or really the x-, y-, and z-coordinate of each 
microsphere, there must be a reference point with a known location. Taking this into 
consideration, there must really be at least three microspheres in each pebble whose 
positions can be precisely measured, no matter where each microsphere resides inside 
the pebble.  
 
4.3 Identifying Each Pebble 
To identify each pebble, a set of “characteristic lengths” is determined. These 
lengths are shown in Fig. 18.  
 
 
Fig. 18. Naming scheme for characteristic lengths identified in template image. 
A 
B 
C LA,B 
LA,C 
LB,C 
(xa, ya, za) 
(xc, yc, zc) 
(xb, yb, zb) 
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These lengths are determined by subtracting the x-, y-, and z-coordinates of the center of 
each microsphere from the opposite microsphere used to create the line. Those 
coordinates can be placed in a matrix from which the matrix of the connecting 
microsphere coordinates can be subtracted. This creates a 3 x 3 matrix of the difference 
in the x-,y-, and z-coordinates. This matrix operation can be seen below: 
 
 
      
      
      
   
      
      
      
   
               
               
               
   
         
            
         
 
      
If this matrix of differences is then transposed and multiplied by the original differences 
matrix, the diagonal of the resulting matrix is the square of the line lengths of interest 
referenced in Fig. 18. This can be seen below: 
 
 
         
            
         
  
          
          
          
 
  
   
     
     
   
     
      
      
  
     
     
     
 
  
 
By taking the square root of each of these diagonal values, the line lengths referenced in 
Fig. 18 are determined as seen below: 
 
    
     
     
     
      
      
    
     
     
       
     
    
   
 
    
     
    
  
 
               
 
This set of characteristic lengths identifies each configuration of microspheres, 
and thereby each pebble. In application, this method will have some uncertainty. This 
uncertainty is introduced by the ultrasound imaging machine. The machine has a 
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resolution at which the position of each microsphere can be determined and 
subsequently, the length of the line between two microspheres. The functionality of the 
ultrasound system and the computer software used determines where this resolution 
uncertainty is applied. Most likely, this uncertainty will be applied to the characteristic 
lengths.  
 
4.4 Matching Pebbles 
 When a pebble is imaged before being placed in the reactor core, an initial image 
is recorded and an initial set of characteristic lengths can be found. This set of lengths is 
considered the template. As subsequent images of the pebble are recorded and the 
characteristic lengths found in those images, this subsequent set of lengths is compared 
to the template set in Fig. 19. If the two sets of characteristic lengths match within the 
statistical error of the imaging system, then it can be concluded that the subsequent 
pebble was indeed the initial pebble placed into the reactor.  
 
 
Fig. 19. Initial image (left) of some pebble placed in reactor core and a (right) a 
subsequent image of some pebble removed from the reactor core.  
 
The microspheres in the subsequent image in Fig. 19 are labeled Q, R, and S 
because when the pebble is imaged by the ultrasound system it will not be oriented in the 
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same manner as when the template image was originally taken. Thus, it cannot be stated 
that microsphere Q in the subsequent image is in fact microsphere A, B, or C in the 
template image. To overcome this limitation, to determine if the two images match, each 
of the characteristic lengths found in the subsequent image must be subtracted from the 
lengths from the template image. Much like when determining the characteristic lengths, 
this creates a matrix of characteristic length differences. The calculation of this matrix 
can be seen below: 
 
  
          
          
          
    
           
           
           
  
 
 
 
                                        
                                       
                                        
 
 
 
  
 
To determine which length from the subsequent image is in fact LA,B, LB,C, or LA,C 
from the initial image, first the absolute value of the minimum difference between LA,B 
and LQ,R, LR,S, or LQ,S is found. Assuming the minimum difference is between LA,B and 
LQ,R. This means that LB,C cannot also be LQ,R. LB,C must either be LR,S or LQ,S. Again, the 
absolute value of the minimum difference is identified; assume it is LQ,S. This then 
means that LA,C and LR,S have the best chance of matching because LQ,S cannot also be 
LA,C. 
With the characteristic lengths in the subsequent image now tied to a length from 
the template, we can determine if the two pebbles do indeed match. If the absolute 
values of the minimum differences calculated and identified previously are each less 
than the resolution of the system, the two pebbles are considered to match and the 
subsequent pebble is identified. 
An additional limitation of this method that must be highlighted is that since the 
lines created are between microspheres and not some known reference, the possibility 
exists for there to be a repetition in the lengths of line. Two microspheres with a 
characteristic length of 1.05 cm can actually be oriented in many different ways within 
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the pebble and still be 1.05 cm apart. It is the combination of the three characteristic 
lengths that make the identification more unique, and thus less likely to repeat.  
 
4.5 Results 
A Microsoft Excel macro was written that performed the procedure described in 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4.  
In the numerical simulation, a set of three characteristic lengths was randomly 
generated. These lengths were considered the characteristic lengths for the initial image 
of a pebble, like LA,B, LB,C, or LA,C  in Fig. 19.  
Next, a set of three characteristic lengths between 0.1 cm and 4.9 cm were 
randomly generated. This set of lengths was considered the characteristic lengths 
determined from a subsequent image of a pebble, like LQ,R, LR,S, or LQ,S in Fig. 19. The 
lower limit of the range was 0.1 cm because the minimum length between the centers of 
any two microspheres can be 0.1 cm, or twice the radius of a single microsphere. The 
upper limit of the range was 4.9 cm because the closet a center of a microsphere can lie 
to the interface between the fueled and non-fueled region of the pebble is 0.05 cm. These 
limits are depicted in Fig. 20. 
 
Fig. 20. Depiction of limits on characteristic lengths for computer simulation. 
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After the set of characteristic lengths for the subsequent image was created, the 
matrix of differences from Section 4.4 was calculated.  Each column of characteristic 
lengths in the matrix of differences represents one of the characteristic lengths in the 
initial image of the pebble. The simulation then finds the minimum difference in each 
column as described in Section 4.4. Finally, if each of the three minimum differences 
found is less than the resolution of the imaging system, the simulated subsequent image 
of a pebble was considered a match to the set of characteristic lengths generated for the 
initial image of a pebble. This process was repeated 10,000,000 times, simulating the 
10,000,000 pebbles expected to pass through the reactor during its operating lifetime. 
After 10,000,000 pebbles were simulated, the resolution was increased by 0.01 cm and 
the process was repeated. The macro written to execute this simulation can be found in 
Appendix B. 
The results of the numerical evaluation can be seen plotted on a log scale in Fig. 
21. In the simulation, the resolution of the imaging system was increased in 0.1 cm 
increments from 0.0 cm. 
 
 
Fig. 21. Plot of the number of repeated pebbles calculated from the numerical 
simulation. 
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The calculate values for the simulation 0.3 cm (3000 micrometers) can be found 
in Appendix C. In this developed safeguards system concept, the ultrasound imaging 
system is expected to have a resolution less than 0.05 cm (500 micrometers). The 
simulation predicts there will be 551 pebbles that will be deemed matches to an initial 
image of a pebble in the lifetime of the reactor. Over the operating lifetime of the 
reactor, this would amount to 0.00551% of pebbles that may be misidentified. Albeit this 
value is very small, it will ultimately be decided by the respective safeguards agency 
implementing this concept that will decide if this is an acceptable risk. At the very least 
it is recommended that the number of microspheres be increased to 4 or 5, further 
increasing the uniqueness of each set of characteristic lengths. This number of repeated 
pebbles due to repeated line lengths could also be further reduced if an exterior reference 
point was introduced and each pebble was oriented in the same manner each time it was 
imaged.  
 In the results from the computer simulation, it can be seen that number of pebbles 
matched to the template pebble begins to increase immediately as the resolution of the 
system is increased. This is expected since the characteristic lengths, generated to 
represent the subsequent pebble images, were randomly generated in Microsoft Excel. 
As expected, the larger the resolution became, the larger the number of pebbles with 
characteristic lengths deemed matches to the initial set of characteristic lengths.   
Upon review of the macro written for the simulation, the random numbers 
generated by Microsoft Excel used to generate a set of characteristic lengths are actually 
pseudorandom. These pseudorandom numbers are used to restrict the generated values 
of characteristic lengths to within the range of 0.1 to 4.9 cm. This limitation causes an 
inflation in the number of “randomly” generated sets of characteristic lengths that would 
be considered a match to the initial value of characteristic lengths.  
 
4.6 Statistical Analysis Conclusions 
The minimum number of microspheres necessary to identify at least 10,000,000 
pebbles was determined to be two. However, to determine the location of these two 
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microspheres in an x, y, z coordinate system, a third reference point of known location is 
necessary. This limitation can be overcome by including a third microsphere and 
measuring the lengths between the three microspheres. This set of lengths was identified 
as the characteristic lengths used to uniquely identify each pebble. Comparing sets of 
characteristic lengths, it was shown that the determination can be made if two pebbles 
will randomly match.  
To determine the number of pebbles that could be expected to have a repeated 
microsphere fingerprint, a simulation was run. In the simulation, sets of characteristic 
lengths were generated and compared to a “true” set of values. It was found that over the 
lifetime of the reactor, at a realistic resolution of 500 μm for an ultrasound imaging 
system, the total number of repeated pebbles will be less than 0.01% of pebbles. Well 
below a significant quantity for either LEU or Pu, this value can be further reduced by 
including more microspheres in each pebble or by orienting the pebbles the same way 
when imaged.  
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5. ASSESSMENT OF REACTOR SYSTEM RESPONSE TO MICROSPHERE 
INCLUSION 
 
To determine how the use of the microspheres would affect the performance of a 
pebble-fueled HTGR, the South African-designed Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) 
400 was modeled using the Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code System Version 5.1 
(MCNP).  
Two types of models were developed: a model where the fuel pebble contained 
no zirconium microspheres and a model where the zirconium microspheres were placed 
in the fuel region of the pebble. An additional model was later created to determine 
effects of placement of zirconium microspheres in the non-fueled region of the pebble. 
Each model contained the same overall reactor design, only the fuel pebble was 
modified. 
 
5.1 Overview of MCNP 
A detailed description of MCNP and how the code is utilized can be found in 
MCNP – A General Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code, Version 5 Volumes I and 
II. MCNP is a general purpose transport code that uses the Monte Carlo method to 
simulate individual particle behavior within a modeled system. For each particle 
simulated, MCNP determines an average behavior. Using a set of average behaviors, 
MCNP infers the average behavior of all particles in the modeled system.
51
  
The multiplication factor of a system can be defined as the measure of the 
increase or decrease in the neutron flux of a system. A system can be modeled as an 
infinite geometry, but at times a more accurate determination of the multiplication factor 
is needed for a realistic system that has a finite geometry. In these cases, keff is 
determined. For the models developed for this research, the effective multiplication 
factor (keff) was determined using MCNP. The effective multiplication factor (keff) 
accounts for neutrons that leak out of a finite system, providing a more complete 
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description of the neutron life cycle in the system. Mathematically expressed as a ratio of 
fission neutron in two subsequent genereations, keff is determined by:
52
  
 
     
                                                   
 
                     
                     
    
               
                        
  
  Eq. (4) 
 
Using Eq. (4), the state of a reactor system can be determined. If keff is greater 
than 1, the reactor is considered supercritical. If keff is less than 1, the reactor is 
considered to be subcritical. If keff is equal to 1, the reactor system is considered to be 
critical.
52
  
The MCNP models were also used to determine the impact of the microspheres 
on the temperature coefficient of reactivity (αT). The temperature coefficient of reactivity 
is a measure of the change in the reactivity of the reactor system per degree change in 
the temperature of the reactor system. While there are many different temperature 
coefficients of reactivity, the moderator temperature coefficient of reactivity and the fuel 
temperature coefficient of reactivity have the most dominant effects on the reactor 
system. The temperature coefficient of reactivity can be negative or positive; however, a 
negative coefficient is preferred. A negative temperature coefficient means as the 
temperature of the reactor increases, the reactivity of the reactor system will decrease, 
reducing power. This self shutdown mechanism helps to prevent a “runaway” reactor 
that could lead to an accident.
52
  
The temperature coefficient of reactivity can be calculated with Eq. (5) by 
determining keff for the same reactor system at two different temperatures and using:  
 
    
 
  
  
  
    
       Eq. (5) 
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5.2 Description of MCNP Model 
5.2.1    Core Structure 
The main structure of the reactor core is composed of three concentric circles. 
This structure can be seen in Figs. 22 and 23. The central cylinder of the reactor is 
composed of graphite. This cylinder is 2.0 m in diameter. Around the periphery of this 
central graphite column, there are nine equally spaced reserve shutdown system (RSS) 
channels, each 15.4 cm in diameter. These RSS channels extend the entire length of the 
reactor core and through the top and bottom reflectors. In the PBMR design, when the 
reactor is shutdown for long periods of time, and the core temperature is expected to fall 
below 100
o
C, these channels are filled with 1 cm diameter borated graphite spheres.
53
 In 
the MCNP models, these nine channels are filled with helium. The annular region 
created by the first two concentric circles is where the fuel pebbles reside. This region is 
3.7 m in diameter. Outside of this annular core region, there is a graphite reflector that is 
5.6 m in diameter. On the edge closest to the annular region, there are 24 equally spaced 
control rod channels, each 15.4 cm in diameter. Each control rod was withdrawn 1.85 m, 
the critical rod height for the model. These control rods are modeled as B4C. On the 
outer edge of this graphite reflector region, there are 36 equally spaced helium gas rising 
channels, each 17.0 cm in diameter. The helium rising channels also extend the entire 
length of the reactor core and through the top and bottom reflectors. Also modeled was a 
0.95 m thick slab of graphite reflector on the top and bottom of the reactor core. In total, 
the height of the reactor core in the model is 12.9 m.
53
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Fig. 22. Axial view of the modeled reactor core. 
 
 
Fig. 23. Cross section of the modeled reactor core. 
 
In Figs. 22 and 23 the central graphite column, outer graphite reflector, and top 
and bottom graphite reflectors have a density of 1.76 g/cm
3
 and 2 ppm boron impurities. 
The helium coolant has a density of 0.01163 g/cm
3
 at a pressure of 70 bar.
54
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material, B4C, has a density of 2.50 g/cm
3
.47 The region filled with black lines represents 
the annular core that is occupied by approximately 450,000 fuel pebbles. This annular 
region is 11 m tall
10
, with the fuel pebbles occupying 9.83 m. Above the fuel occupied 
region of the core is the helium plenum. 
5.2.2    TRISO Particle 
The TRISO particle modeled can be seen in Fig. 24. In each model, the TRISO 
particle is enriched to 5.7 wt % 
235
U. This corresponds to the expected enrichment of the 
PBMR core when loaded with its initial load of fresh fuel.
20
 Each TRISO particle is 
comprised of a fuel kernel with 0.5 mm diameter and density of 10.85 g/cm
3
. The kernel 
is then covered in a 0.095 mm thick inner layer of porous carbon with a density of 0.98 
g/cm
3
. Next, there is a layer of pyrolytic carbon (IPyC) that is 0.04 mm thick with a 
density of 1.865 g/cm
3
. Then there is a layer of silicon carbide that is 0.035 mm thick 
with a density of 3.20 g/cm
3
. The silicon carbide is comprised of natural silicon with 
92.23% 
28
Si, 4.67% 
29
Si, and 3.1% 
30
Si. The outermost layer of the TRISO particle is 
pyrolytic carbon (OPyC) that is the same thickness and density as the IPyC layer. In 
total, the TRISO particle is 0.92 mm in diameter.
18, 55, 56
  
 
 
Fig. 24. Cross section view of the model TRISO particle. 
Fuel kernel: UO2 
Porous carbon 
IPyC 
SiC 
OPyC 
  
 
66 
5.2.3    Fuel Pebble with No Microspheres 
The fuel pebble is made up of two regions, the inner fueled region which 
contains the TRISO particles, and the outer non-fueled region. The fueled region of the 
pebble is 5.0 cm in diameter and the non-fueled region is 0.5 cm thick. The fuel pebble 
model can be seen in Fig. 25. The graphite matrix that contains the TRISO particles and 
entirely comprises the non-fueled region of the pebble has a density of 1.76 g/cm
3
 and a 
boron impurity of 2 ppm. The TRISO particles were modeled centered within an evenly 
spaced cubic lattice structure that represents approximately 15,000 TRISO particles.
57
 In 
total, the TRISO particles occupy approximately 9.34% of the total volume of the fueled 
region. There is approximately 9.0 g of uranium in each fuel pebble. The input for this 
model can be found in Appendix D. 
 
 
Fig. 25. Cross section view of the modeled fuel pebble. 
 
5.2.4    Fuel Pebble with Microspheres 
In the model with the microspheres in the fueled region, the microspheres were 
explicitly placed at random intersections of the TRISO lattice structure. An example of a 
pebble with microspheres in the fueled region can be seen in Fig. 26. Due to the nature 
of the pebble lattice structure, the microspheres were placed in the same position in each 
pebble in the core. This input file can be found in Appendix E. 
 
Non-fueled region 
Fueled region 
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Fig. 26. Example of a pebble with microspheres in the fueled region (TRISO particles 
have been removed to better show placement of microspheres). 
 
The microspheres used in the models are composed of zirconium oxide with 3% 
yttrium oxide (97% ZrO2-3% Y2O3). The zirconium is natural zirconium containing 
51.45% 
90
Zr, 11.22% 
91
Zr, 17.15% 
92
Zr, 17.38% 
94
Zr, and 2.8% 
96
Zr. The 3% yttrium 
oxide is comprised of natural yttrium, 
89
Y.
56
 
5.2.5    Pebble Lattice Structure 
In the actual reactor design, as pebbles are inserted into the PBMR core, each 
pebble is explicitly placed to achieve the best burnup. As the pebbles move toward the 
bottom of the reactor core, their movement is random. Within MCNP, this random 
packing cannot be explicitly modeled, however by placing the fuel pebbles in a body 
centered cubic (BCC) lattice structure, a 68% packing fraction can be achieved. This is 
close to the PBMR 61% average packing fraction.
57
 This means a fuel pebble is located 
in the center of a cube such that in each of the eight corners of the cube, one eighth of 
the volume of a fuel pebble is also placed. This BCC lattice structure can be seen in Fig. 
27. In all of the MCNP models, the core contained approximately 450,000 fuel pebbles.  
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Fig. 27. BCC lattice structure created in modeled core (TRISO particles have been 
removed from fueled region).  
 
5.2.6    Source Definition 
For each model, the source point was placed inside a fuel kernel in an individual 
TRISO particle. Each model was run with 700 active cycles of 1000 particles each. 
 
5.3 Results 
Of interest in this neutronics analysis is the determination of the reactivity effects 
the 1 mm diameter microspheres will have on the reactor core and what impact this 
subsequent reactivity effect may have on the safety of the core, mainly the temperature 
coefficient of reactivity.  
5.3.1    Impact of Microsphere Inclusion on Reactivity of Reactor System 
To determine the reactivity effects of the microspheres, the effective 
multiplication factor (keff) was calculated by MCNP. Each model was at 300 K with the 
control rods withdrawn 1.85 m and RSS channels filled with helium. Models were 
created modeling 0 to 50 microspheres in the fueled region, in increments of five 
microspheres. The resulting keff was graphed with the standard deviation for each value, 
and the average keff for all models. The MCNP calculated keff values can be seen in Table 
II and graphed in Fig. 28. 
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Table II. MCNP calculated keff values for microspheres in the fueled region of pebble at 
300 K. 
 
Number of 
Microspheres k eff Standard deviation
0 1.00321 0.00095
5 1.00203 0.00098
10 1.00310 0.00098
15 1.00341 0.00100
20 1.00548 0.00097
25 1.00343 0.00100
30 1.00129 0.00098
35 1.00286 0.00099
40 1.00520 0.00103
45 1.00371 0.00097
50 1.00081 0.00098
Microspheres in fueled region of pebble
 
 
 
Fig. 28. Plot of keff with microspheres in the fueled region at 300 K. 
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With the microspheres in the fueled region of the pebble, the average keff at 300 
K was 1.00313 ± 0.000297.  
In order to determine the temperature coefficient of reactivity, the same models 
with 0 to 50 microspheres were used, but with the temperature of the entire reactor at 
600 K. The density of the helium coolant was changed from 0.01163 g/cm
3
 to 0.00553 
g/cm
3
 at 70 bar. It should be noted that the densities of other materials in the reactor 
were not changed and subsequently, thermal expansion of the materials has not been 
accounted for in the models. The MCNP calculated keff values can be seen in Table III 
and graphed in Fig. 29. 
 
Table III. MCNP calculated keff with microspheres in the fueled region of the pebble at 
600 K. 
 
Number of 
Microspheres k eff Standard deviation
0 0.97045 0.00097
5 0.97223 0.00103
10 0.97330 0.00097
15 0.97013 0.00100
20 0.97110 0.00093
25 0.97237 0.00100
30 0.97109 0.00095
35 0.97080 0.00095
40 0.97246 0.00099
45 0.97057 0.00096
50 0.97298 0.00096
Microspheres in fueled region of pebble
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 Fig. 29. Plot of keff with microspheres in the fueled region at 600 K. 
 
With the microspheres in the fueled region of the pebble, the average keff at 600 
K was 0.97159 ± 0.000294.  
From the results obtained, it is clear that there is no discernable trend in keff with 
an increasing quantity of microspheres. At 300 K, with no microspheres in the pebble, 
keff was determined to be 1.00321 ± 0.00095 and with 50 microspheres in the pebble keff 
was determined to be 1.00081 ± 0.00098. With no microspheres in the pebble at 600 K, 
keff was determined to be 0.97045 ± 0.00097 and with 50 microspheres in the pebble keff 
was determined to be 0.97298 ± 0.00096. When compared to the overall average keff of 
all models, each keff is within, or very close to within, three standard deviations of the 
average. Since no quantity of microspheres resulted in a keff that fell well outside of the 
average, from these results it can be concluded that the inclusion of 1 mm diameter ZrO2 
microspheres is not statistically significant, thus having no impact on the reactivity of 
the reactor system.   
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5.3.2     Impact of Microsphere Inclusion on Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity 
Now that keff at each interval of microspheres has been determined at two 
temperatures, Eq. (5) can be used to calculate the temperature coefficient of reactivity 
(αT) at each interval. The results of this calculation for microspheres in the fueled region 
of the pebble can be seen in Table IV and graphed in Fig. 30. 
 
Table IV. Calculated αT with microspheres in the fueled and non-fueled regions of 
pebble. 
 
Number of Microspheres αT  (∆k/k/
o
C) Uncertainty
0 -0.000112 0.000005
5 -0.000102 0.000005
10 -0.000102 0.000005
15 -0.000114 0.000005
20 -0.000117 0.000005
25 -0.000106 0.000005
30 -0.000104 0.000005
35 -0.000110 0.000005
40 -0.000112 0.000005
45 -0.000113 0.000005
50 -0.000095 0.000005
Microspheres in fueled region of pebble
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Fig. 30. Plot of αT with microspheres in the fueled region. 
 
For microspheres in the fueled region, the average temperature coefficient of 
reactivity was calculated to be -0.000108 ± 0.000001 ∆k/k/oC.  
With no microspheres present, αT was calculated to be 0.000112 ± 0.000005 and 
with 50 microspheres present αT was calculated to be -0.000095 ± 0.000005. These 
results confirm that the pebble-fueled HTGR model has the desired negative temperature 
coefficient of reactivity. Like the impact of the microspheres on keff, for each interval of 
microspheres, when compared to the average, the calculated temperature coefficient of 
reactivity fell within statistical variance essentially showing no change with the inclusion 
of the microspheres. With no discernable trend in this data, it can be concluded that the 
inclusion of 1 mm diameter ZrO2 microspheres would not impact the temperature 
coefficient of reactivity. 
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5.3.3    Placement of Microspheres in the Non-Fueled Region 
The impact of microspheres placed in the non-fueled region of the pebble was 
also considered.  An example of a pebble with microspheres in the non-fueled region can 
be seen in Fig. 31. This input can be found in Appendix F. 
 
Fig. 31. Example of a pebble with microspheres in the non-fueled region.  
 
These models were simulated under the same conditions as the models with the 
microspheres in the fueled region. Models were at 300 K and 600 K with the control 
rods withdrawn 1.85 m and RSS channels filled with helium. In 600 K models, helium 
density was adjusted to 0.00553 g/cm
3
 at 70 bar. Thus, thermal expansion of other 
materials was not accounted for in these results. The MCNP calculated keff values can be 
seen in Table V and graphed in Figs. 32 and 33. 
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Table V. MCNP calculated keff values for microspheres in non-fueled regions of pebble 
at 300 K and 600 K. 
 
Number of 
Microspheres k eff
Standard 
deviation k eff
Standard 
deviation
0 1.00321 0.00095 0.97045 0.00097
5 1.00345 0.00098 0.97182 0.00094
10 1.00366 0.00098 0.97153 0.00100
15 1.00390 0.00096 0.97152 0.00095
20 1.00252 0.00099 0.97030 0.00098
25 1.00227 0.00102 0.97301 0.00095
30 1.00392 0.00104 0.97125 0.00096
35 1.00265 0.00098 0.97140 0.00099
40 1.00422 0.00098 0.97415 0.00099
45 1.00196 0.00097 0.97127 0.00100
50 1.00273 0.00101 0.97249 0.00095
Microspheres in nonfueled 
region of pebble at 300 K
Microspheres in nonfueled 
region of pebble at 600 K
 
 
 
Fig. 32. Plot of keff with microspheres in the non-fueled region at 300 K. 
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Fig. 33. Plot of keff with microspheres in the non-fueled region at 600 K. 
 
When the microspheres were present in the non-fueled region of the pebble at 
300 K, the average keff was 1.00314 ± 0.000298. At 600 K, the average keff was 0.97175 
± 0.000293.  
The temperature coefficient of reactivity was again calculated using Eq. (5). The 
calculated results can be seen in Table VI and graphed in Fig. 34. 
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Table VI. Calculated αT with microspheres in the fueled and non-fueled regions of 
pebble. 
 
Number of Microspheres αT  (∆k/k/
o
C) Uncertainty
0 -0.000112 0.000005
5 -0.000108 0.000005
10 -0.000110 0.000005
15 -0.000111 0.000005
20 -0.000110 0.000005
25 -0.000100 0.000005
30 -0.000112 0.000005
35 -0.000107 0.000005
40 -0.000102 0.000005
45 -0.000105 0.000005
50 -0.000103 0.000005
Microspheres in nonfueled region of pebble
 
 
 
Fig. 34. Plot of αT with microspheres in the non-fueled region. 
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The average temperature coefficient of reactivity for microspheres in the non-
fueled region was -0.000107 ± 0.000001 ∆k/k/oC.  
 Like microsphere placement in the fueled region, inclusion of 1 mm ZrO2 
microspheres in the non-fueled region of the pebble had no discernable impact on the 
reactivity or the temperature coefficient of reactivity of the modeled reactor.  
5.3.4    Identifying a Trend 
Since no trend was seen in the results with a 1 mm microsphere, additional 
models were created with larger microspheres to determine if the microspheres would 
have any effect on keff. Models were created that contained 2 mm, 3 mm, and 4 mm 
microspheres in the non-fueled region of the pebble. These microspheres could only be 
placed in the non-fueled region because placement in the fueled region would have 
required removal of fuel material in the model. Maintaining the same amount of fuel in 
the pebble is key to ensuring that this safeguards concept does not negatively impact the 
reactor design. Again, models were created that contained 0 to 50 microspheres in 
increments of 5 microspheres at 300 K. The calculated keff results for 1 mm, 2 mm, 3 
mm, and 4 mm microspheres in the non-fueled region of the pebble can be seen in Table 
VII and plotted in Fig. 35. 
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Table VII. MCNP calculated keff with various diameters of microspheres in the non-
fueled region of pebble at 300 K. 
 
Number of 
Microspheres k eff Standard deviation k eff Standard deviation
0 1.00321 0.00095 1.00321 0.00095
5 1.00345 0.00098 1.00168 0.00100
10 1.00366 0.00098 1.00393 0.00094
15 1.00390 0.00096 1.00207 0.00095
20 1.00252 0.00099 0.99966 0.00093
25 1.00227 0.00102 1.00190 0.00100
30 1.00392 0.00104 1.00238 0.00096
35 1.00265 0.00098 1.00143 0.00098
40 1.00422 0.00098 1.00332 0.00099
45 1.00196 0.00097 1.00111 0.00099
50 1.00273 0.00101 1.00207 0.00100
Number of 
Microspheres k eff Standard deviation k eff Standard deviation
0 1.00321 0.00095 1.00321 0.00095
5 1.00142 0.00099 0.99959 0.00102
10 1.00165 0.00095 0.99821 0.00099
15 1.00100 0.00098 0.99631 0.00101
20 0.99846 0.00100 0.99829 0.00098
25 1.00024 0.00100 0.99758 0.00099
30 1.00046 0.00102 0.99618 0.00097
35 1.00006 0.00100 0.99161 0.00097
40 0.99832 0.00099 0.99135 0.00099
45 0.99620 0.00100 0.98974 0.00099
50 0.99787 0.00097 0.98832 0.00094
1 mm microsphere 2 mm microsphere
3 mm microsphere 4 mm microsphere
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Fig. 35. Plot of keff with various diameters of microspheres in the non-fueled region at 
300 K. 
 
From these results it is possible to see that as an increasing quantity of larger 
diameter microspheres are placed in the non-fueled region of the pebble, keff is reduced. 
This can be attributed to the increasing amount of graphite that is removed as larger 
microspheres are added to the non-fueled region. This graphite that encases each TRISO 
particle and each pebble acts as a local reflector and moderator for neutrons created in 
the fuel kernel and those that escape the pebble. As the graphite material is removed, 
more neutrons are allowed to escape the system and interact with materials that are not 
fissionable. The resulting impact on the temperature coefficient of reactivity was not 
calculated because it can be reasonably expected that at 600 K there will be a decrease in 
keff as microsphere diameter increases. This would subsequently result in a negative trend 
in the temperature coefficient of reactivity. 
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5.4 Reactor Response Conclusions 
By developing a reactor model in MCNP, it was possible to determine what 
impact inclusion of ZrO2 microspheres would have on the reactivity of the reactor (keff), 
as well as their impact on the temperature coefficient of reactivity of the reactor (αT). 
When the keff for each model is compared to the average keff all of the models, inclusion 
of the 1 mm ZrO2 microspheres was found to be statistically insignificant. From the 
obtained keff values, αT was calculated. Again, the inclusion of 1 mm ZrO2 was found to 
be insignificant. When the microspheres were moved to the non-fueled region of the 
pebble, their impact on keff and αT was again found to be insignificant. A trend in keff in 
the models that contained microspheres was found when the size of the microspheres 
was increased. It was found that as the size of the microspheres increased, the increasing 
amount of graphite reflector and moderator removed would eventually have a negative 
impact on keff, reducing system reactivity. While this model was not benchmarked to 
standard PBMR models, by addressing the relative change in keff and αT due to 
microsphere inclusion it can be concluded that inclusion of less than fifty 1 mm ZrO2 
microspheres will have no impact on the reactivity or the temperature coefficient of 
reactivity of the pebble-fueled HTGR. 
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6. EVALUATION OF ULTRASOUND IMAGING SYSTEM 
 
The transmission characteristics of ultrasound waves through graphite are 
unknown. A proof-of-concept experiment was developed to determine the effectiveness 
of ultrasound in imaging the microspheres.  
Two samples were created that contained a known number of 1 mm ZrO2-Y2O3 
microspheres. Using an ultrasound imaging system, an image of the configuration of the 
microspheres was taken. To determine the effectiveness of ultrasound wave transmission 
through graphite, two graphite plates of 1 mm and 5 mm thickness were placed on top of 
the samples. The 5 mm thick graphite plate corresponds to the thickness of the non-
fueled region of the pebble. Images of the microsphere fingerprint were again acquired 
using the ultrasound imaging system. The resulting image was then compared to either a 
visual photograph of the configuration or previous ultrasound image to determine if all 
the microspheres could be accounted for. 
 
6.1 Equipment 
The ultrasound imaging system used was an Ultrasonix Sonix RP System. The 
energy range of operation for the system is 4.8 to 14 MHz. This system has a 3.8 cm 
long transducer with a 1 mm wide ultrasound beam. The beam can be moved into 128 
elements to produce 128 lines.  
 
6.2 Experimental Procedure 
For the first sample, or phantom, a base layer of gelatin was created. This layer 
was created from 156 g of water containing 5.1 g (approximately 3%) of Porcine skin 
gelatin type A. The gelatin was allowed to semi-firm. Next, twenty 97% ZrO2-3% Y2O3 
microspheres were randomly dispersed on top of this layer of gelatin. Then, an 
additional layer of gelatin was poured over the microspheres and previous layer of 
gelatin. This layer was comprised of approximately the same composition of water and 
gelatin as the base layer. The entire sample was then allowed to completely firm. 
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A second phantom was created using the same procedure as above, but this 
phantom was created with approximately 5% gelatin and approximately 3% of the 
additive agar. Agar is a common thickener and impurity added when imaging phantoms 
of biological material. It mimics the noise expected in biological material. In this 
application, the agar was added to increase the noise in the image. If the microspheres 
were not visible among this low level “biological” noise that was still closer to a liquid 
than a solid material, it could be concluded that imaging would not be possible in a solid 
inorganic sphere.  
Each phantom was removed from its plastic mold, placed on top of a 1 cm thick 
rubber mat, and the frequency used for imaging was 10 MHz. To image the phantoms, 
the transducer was placed perpendicular to the plane containing the microspheres. The 
transducer was then moved across the plane until all of the microspheres had been 
passed. This placement is depicted in Fig. 36.  
 
 
Fig. 36. Placement of ultrasound transducer on phantom containing microspheres. 
 
By moving the transducer in this manner, an image of each the xz-, yz-, and xy-
planes is a produced. The system software is then capable of generating a three-
dimensional (3D) image of the microspheres.  
z 
y 
x 
Transducer 
Phantom 
Microspheres 
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6.3 Results
4
 
6.3.1     Non-Agar Sample 
Photographs of the non-agar sample can be seen in Figs. 37 and 38. Following 
the axis orientation in Fig. 36, the resulting xz-, yz-, and xy-plane images can be seen in 
Fig. 39.  
 
 
Fig. 37. Axial image of the non-agar phantom, showing placement of microspheres. 
Insert is a close up of microspheres. 
 
 
Fig. 38. Cross section image of the non-agar phantom, showing placement of 
microspheres. 
 
                                                          
4
 It is important to note that all images presented as part of these results were filtered using the Ultrasonix 
Sonix RP System. After the images were taken off the system, no manipulation other than cropping and 
orientation was performed on the images. 
Microspheres 
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(a)     (b)     (c) 
Fig. 39. Ultrasound images of (a) xz-plane (b) yz-plane (c) xy-plane produced in 3D 
imaging mode. The yellow dot and green arrow are produced by the imaging software 
and do not represent characteristics of the microsphere fingerprint. 
 
In Figs. 39 (a) and (b) the microspheres lie parallel to the imaging plane. The xy-
plane image seen in Fig. 39 (c) clearly shows the twenty microspheres suspended in the 
gelatin. A side-by-side comparison of the xy-plane image in Fig. 39 with the 
configuration shown in Fig. 37 can be seen in Fig. 40.  
 
  
Fig. 40. Side-by-side comparison of ultrasound produced microsphere placement in xz-
plane (left) and microsphere placement seen in initial image (right). 
 
The distortion in the ultrasound image can be attributed to the speed at which the 
transducer is moved by the operator across the area containing microspheres. The system 
captures 128 frames, 1 mm wide, as the transducer is moved across the area with the 
microspheres. The faster the transducer is moved, the 1 mm slices are taken further 
apart, capturing less of each microsphere. The slower the image moved, the slices are 
closer, together or maybe even overlapping, stretching the appearance of the 
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microspheres. Depicted in Fig. 41 is the principle is when the transducer is moved too 
quickly. 
 
 
(a)    (b)    (c) 
Fig. 41. When the transducer is moved too quickly in 3D imaging mode, (a) the original 
configuration can be distorted. This occurs when ultrasound beam is transmitted, missing 
some areas blacked-out in (b). Once reconstructed, (c) the resulting image has a distorted 
configuration. 
 
As can be seen in side-by-side comparison of the system rendered 3D image in 
Fig. 42, all twenty microspheres that were suspended in the non-agar phantom are 
visible. This image was manually filtered using the ultrasound system to obtain the best 
image possible.  
 
  
 
Fig. 42. Side-by-side comparison of ultrasound produced microsphere placement in 3D 
rendered image (left) of non-agar phantom , with no graphite plates, and microsphere 
placement seen in initial image (right). 
 
 Following these results, next a 1 mm thick graphite plate was placed on top of 
the phantom. This layout can be graphically depicted in Fig. 43. A thin layer of water 
was placed between the graphite and phantom and the graphite and transducer to act as a 
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buffer medium. The manually filtered 3D rendered image of this setup can be seen in 
Fig. 44. All twenty microspheres were identified in Fig. 44 (a).  
 
 
 
Fig. 43. Arrangement of transducer, graphite, phantom, and rubber mat for imaging. 
 
An issue with the use of the water buffer was the non-uniform thickness of the 
water layer. As the transducer was moved across the phantom, in some areas air bubbles 
were may have crossed the imaging plane. As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, ultrasound 
wave transmission in gases is greatly reduced. This transmission reduction will result in 
distortions in the resulting image. Air bubbles could have been introduced at several 
steps during the experiment like preparation of the phantom. However, since these 
distortions were not apparent in the 3D rendered image the phantom without graphite, it 
is likely that the air was introduced in one of the layers of the water buffer. For example, 
if the graphite was shifted or lifted, air could be trapped in the water buffer between the 
graphite and phantom. Suspected air bubble distortions in Fig. 44 (a) have been marked 
in Fig. 45. 
 
Transducer 
Water 
1 mm thick graphite plate  
Water 
Non-agar phantom with microspheres 
Rubber mat 
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(a)     (b) 
Fig. 44. Side-by-side comparison of ultrasound produced microsphere placement in 3D 
rendered image (left) of non-agar sample, with 1 mm thick graphite plate, and 
microsphere placement seen in initial image (right). 
 
 
Fig. 45. Distortions produced in 3D image (marked by red arrows and circles) suspected 
to be caused by air bubbles in path of transducer. 
 
In an attempt to produce a clearer image, the water buffer between the transducer 
and graphite was replaced with ultrasound gel. The manually filtered 3D rendered image 
using this setup can be seen in Fig. 46.  
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Fig. 46. Side-by-side comparison of ultrasound produced microsphere placement in 3D 
rendered image (left) of non-agar sample, through 1 mm thick graphite plate with 
ultrasound gel buffer between transducer and graphite plate. Image on right is 
microsphere placement seen in initial image. 
 
In the left image of Fig. 46, all twenty microspheres were identified and there are 
no viewable distortions that can be attributed to air bubbles. As such, for the remainder 
of the experiment, ultrasound gel was used as the buffer between the transducer and 
graphite.  
Next, the 1 mm thick graphite plate was removed and replaced with a 5 mm thick 
plate. The resulting 3D rendered image can be seen in Fig. 47.  
 
   
Fig. 47. Side-by-side comparison of ultrasound produced microsphere placement in 3D 
rendered image (left) of non-agar sample, through 5 mm thick graphite plate with 
ultrasound gel buffer between transducer and graphite plate. Image on right is 
microsphere placement seen in initial image. 
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In Fig. 47, all twenty microspheres can be identified in the 3D rendered image. 
However, as can been seen, there is a large distortion across the entirety of the image. 
This distortion is due to large air bubbles in the ultrasound gel.  
6.3.2     Agar Sample 
A close-up picture of the agar phantom with the microspheres can be seen in Fig. 
48. The cloudy appearance of the phantom prevented visual confirmation of the 
microsphere configuration before images were taken. To overcome this, the agar 
phantom was imaged without a graphite plate. A side-by-side comparison of this image 
and the 3D rendered image taken through the 5 mm graphite plate can be seen in Fig. 49.  
 
 
Fig. 48. Close-up photo of agar containing sample with microsphere placement 
highlighted by red circle.  
 
 
Microspheres 
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Fig. 49. Side-by-side comparison of ultrasound produced microsphere placement in 3D 
rendered image (left) of agar sample, through 5 mm thick graphite plate with ultrasound 
gel buffer between transducer and graphite plate. Image on right is microsphere 
placement in 3D rendered image of sample phantom without 5 mm thick graphite plate. 
 
Comparing the two resulting images, it is possible to discern twenty 
microspheres. The layout with the 5 mm thick graphite plate provides better clarity than 
the sample without the graphite plate. However, the microspheres in Fig. 49 (b) appear 
smaller than those in Fig. 49 (a). Due to the lack of clarity in the image with no graphite 
plate, and the lack of a pre-imaging visual confirmation of the configuration, it cannot be 
stated that these images show the true configuration of microspheres placed in the agar 
sample.  
6.3.3 Determination of Ultrasound System Resolution 
Using the images in Fig. 40 it is possible to determine an approximate resolution 
of the ultrasound system. In the initial photograph of the non-agar sample, it is known 
that the microspheres each have a nominal 1 mm diameter. By measuring the distance 
between the microspheres positioned closely together in the initial image and comparing 
that to the respective distance in the ultrasound image, it is possible to gauge the ability 
of the ultrasound system to discern between two microspheres. Circled in Fig. 50 are the 
microspheres used to determine this resolution. 
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Fig. 50. Comparison of initial image and ultrasound image and microspheres used to 
approximate a resolution for the imaging system. 
 
 For the two microspheres in the initial image, the distance between the centers of 
the microspheres was determined to be approximately 1.4 mm. To determine the 
distance between these two microspheres in the ultrasound image, the distortion 
associated with the translation speed of the transducer had to be accounted for. This was 
done by calculating the percent difference between the line lengths connecting the 
centers of microspheres approximately in direct line of each other. The microspheres 
used for this purpose are connected by lines in Fig. 50. From this it was determined that 
the microsphere fingerprint in the ultrasound image appears 25% larger horizontally and 
22% smaller vertically than the initial image. Accounting for this distortion, the distance 
between the two microspheres was measured to be approximately 1 mm. This means, 
that the imaging system is capable of determining microsphere position to within 0.4 
mm (400 microns).  
 
6.4 Ultrasound Imaging Conclusions 
The experiment developed tested the effectiveness of ultrasound imaging of the 
ZrO2 microspheres through graphite plates of two thicknesses, 1 mm and 5 mm. It was 
found that a configuration of microspheres is visible through graphite when the 
microspheres are suspended in a gelatin phantom and a gelatin phantom that contained 
the noise additive agar.  
Some limitation to the use of ultrasound was found in this experimental setup. 
Near-liquid state gelatin and ultrasound gel have a tendency to form air bubbles during 
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the fabrication and imaging processes. As such, the transmission of the ultrasound waves 
through these air bubbles is hindered, reducing image quality and producing distortions 
that can be misinterpreted as microspheres.  
This experiment showed that ultrasound imaging of a microsphere configuration 
through thin graphite plates is possible. The resolution of the system was determined to 
be approximately 0.04 cm. However, it cannot be conclusively stated that an ultrasound 
system can or cannot image a microsphere configuration in a spherical pebble. Focus 
must be placed on the limited scope of the experiment. These results are of ultrasound 
imaging of microspheres through graphite, not ultrasound imaging of microspheres 
embedded in graphite. Also, this experiment imaged samples that only contained 
microspheres. In reality, the microspheres will be dispersed among TRISO particles. 
Thus, additional work must be performed to certify the use of an ultrasound system to 
image placement of microspheres in a fuel pebble.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 To deter and detect the diversion of nuclear material, nuclear facilities must be 
safeguarded. As new types of nuclear facilities are designed and built, the IAEA must 
address the challenges associated with safeguarding the design against diversion. The 
pebble-fueled HTGR is not a new reactor design. However, the recent developments in 
the design by the Republic of South Africa and the export potential of a People’s 
Republic of China-designed pebble-fueled HTGR have placed an increased importance 
on developing a safeguards approach that can adequately account for the nuclear 
material present at such a facility.  
 Two safeguards approaches have been previously proposed for the pebble-fueled 
HTGR. The first approach relies upon extensive application of dual C/S measures and 
the second approach combines safeguards techniques commonly applied in bulk-type 
material facilities with measures traditionally utilized at a reactor facility. By reviewing 
safeguards approaches at other types of reactor facilities, it was determined that neither 
proposed safeguards approach can fully restore the CoK in cases when C/S measures 
have failed or been compromised, or when bulk-type material measurement techniques 
have been failed or been manipulated. Additionally, each proposed approach introduces 
an amount of material unaccounted for that could be exploited by an adversary to divert 
material from the reactor facility. 
 A new safeguards system concept for the pebble-fueled HTGR that would be 
capable of restoring CoK in most, if not all, failure scenarios, was developed and 
evaluated. It was determined that to restore CoK, each fuel pebble must be uniquely 
identifiable. Identification methods addressed determined that internal placement of 
microspheres in a random configuration to create a unique fingerprint was best. To 
determine the location of each microsphere an imaging system had to be chosen that 
could be used on fresh, core, and spent fuel present at the reactor facility. Ultrasound-
based imaging was found to be unhindered by the radiation emitted by core and spent 
fuel and as such, was the chosen imaging system evaluated as part of this concept. The 
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chosen material for the microspheres was ZrO2, doped with the additive Y2O3. ZrO2 was 
chosen for it stability at high temperature, low neutron absorption cross section, and 
chemical stability in the graphite environment of a fuel pebble.  
 The system was evaluated to determine the minimum number of microsphere 
necessary to uniquely identify each fuel pebble, the probability that a configuration 
inside a pebble will randomly match another, the impact that these microspheres would 
have on the neutronics and safety of the reactor system, and the effectiveness of 
ultrasound in imaging microspheres through graphite.  
 It was found that the minimum number of microspheres necessary to be able to 
uniquely identify each pebble is three. Using these three microspheres it was possible to 
determine that only 0.00551% of pebbles that pass through the reactor in its lifetime may 
be misidentified. It was found that less than fifty 1 mm diameter zirconium oxide 
microspheres will have no negative or positive impact on the reactivity of the reactor or 
the temperature coefficient of reactivity. Lastly, an ultrasound imaging system was used 
to evaluate the effectiveness of ultrasound imaging through graphite plates. These results 
of the experiments showed that ultrasound wave transmission through thin graphite 
plates is possible and that a small grouping of twenty microspheres can be imaged to 
within 0.04 cm.  
 Overall the evaluation of the proposed safeguards system concept showed that 
using a unique microsphere fingerprint to identify each fuel pebble is possible. However, 
additional work must be completed to certify the use of an ultrasound system to 
determine the location of the microspheres. There are several recommendations for 
future research in developing and implementing this safeguards concept:  
 The method use to determine the minimum number of microspheres necessary to 
uniquely identify each pebble was built by using unique microsphere locations. 
The later developed method to identify each pebble was based upon 
characteristic lengths. The minimum should be re-evaluated to determine if the 
minimum number of microspheres would change if the possible number of 
unique lengths was considered. 
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 A better model that determines the random probability of matching microsphere 
fingerprints based on characteristic lengths, and not volumes, should be found 
and compared to the developed computer simulation results. 
 Further imaging experiments with ultrasound imaging should utilize a 
computerized, mechanically controlled system to move the transducer.  
 Future samples should embed the microspheres in graphite. 
 Radiation damage, and its effect, to the ultrasound system from irradiated 
pebbles should be quantified. 
 The impact of the microspheres on the manufacturing of the fuel pebbles and 
what affects their inclusion may have. 
 The costs associated with implementation of the concept should be evaluated to 
determine if the system would be cost prohibitive.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Fig. A-1. Flow chart of manufacturing process for fuel kernel, TRISO particle, and fuel 
pebble (taken from C. TANG, T. TANG, Y. ZHU, J. LI, and X. NI, “Design and 
manufacture of the fuel element for the 10 MW high temperature gas-cooled reactor,” 
Nucl. Eng. Des., 218, 91-102 (2002). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 Sub ExpSim() 
' 
' ExpSim Macro 
' 
 
' 
    Application.ScreenUpdating = False 
     
    Dim irow As Double 
    Dim iMatch As Double 'number of matches 
    Dim iloop As Double 'number of pebbles 
    Dim irand1 As Double 'random number 1 
    Dim irand2 As Double 'random number 2 
    Dim irand3 As Double 'random number 3 
    Dim iRmax As Double 'max radius of pebble region where microshperes can be 
    Dim iRusphere As Double 'radius of microsphere 
    Dim iRes As Double 'resolution of system 
    Dim iTLab As Double 
    Dim iTLbc As Double 
    Dim iTLac As Double 
    Dim iMLqr As Double 
    Dim iMLrs As Double 
    Dim iMLqs As Double 
    Dim iB As Double 
    Dim iC As Double 
    Dim ifill1 As Double 
    Dim ifill2 As Double 
    Dim ifill3 As Double 
    Dim ifill4 As Double 
    Dim ifill5 As Double 
    Dim ifill6 As Double 
    Dim ifill7 As Double 
    Dim ifill8 As Double 
    Dim ifill9 As Double 
     
    irow = 2 
    iRes = 0 
       
Start1: 
     
    iMatch = 0 
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    iloop = 1 
    iRmax = 2.45 
    iRusphere = 0.05 
    iTLab = 3.10680203190317 
    iTLbc = 2.14898950599226 
    iTLac = 2.50657170668777 
       
Start2: 
 
 
        irand1 = Rnd 
        irand2 = Rnd 
        irand3 = Rnd 
         
        iMLqr = irand1 * ((iRmax * 2) - (iRusphere * 2)) + (iRusphere * 2) 
        iMLrs = irand2 * ((iRmax * 2) - (iRusphere * 2)) + (iRusphere * 2) 
        iMLqs = irand3 * ((iRmax * 2) - (iRusphere * 2)) + (iRusphere * 2) 
         
        ifill1 = Abs(iTLab - iMLqr) 
        ifill2 = Abs(iTLab - iMLrs) 
        ifill3 = Abs(iTLab - iMLqs) 
        ifill4 = Abs(iTLbc - iMLqr) 
        ifill5 = Abs(iTLbc - iMLrs) 
        ifill6 = Abs(iTLbc - iMLqs) 
        ifill7 = Abs(iTLac - iMLqr) 
        ifill8 = Abs(iTLac - iMLrs) 
        ifill9 = Abs(iTLac - iMLqs) 
         
        If (ifill1 <= ifill2 And ifill1 <= ifill3) Then 
            GoTo Line1 
             
        Else: GoTo Line5 
         
        End If 
Line5: 
        If (ifill2 <= ifill1 And ifill2 <= ifill3) Then 
            GoTo Line2 
        Else: GoTo Line6 
         
        End If 
Line6: 
        If (ifill3 <= ifill2 And ifill3 <= ifill1) Then 
            GoTo Line3 
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        Else 
         
            ActiveWorkbook.Save 
         
        End If 
                     
Line1: 
        If (ifill5 < ifill6) Then 
         
            If (ifill1 <= iRes And ifill5 <= iRes And ifill9 <= iRes) Then 
                 
                iMatch = iMatch + 1 
                iloop = iloop + 1 
                 
            Else 
                 
                iloop = iloop + 1 
                 
            End If 
                                 
        Else 
             
            If (ifill1 <= iRes And ifill6 <= iRes And ifill8 <= iRes) Then 
             
                iMatch = iMatch + 1 
                iloop = iloop + 1 
             
            Else 
             
                iloop = iloop + 1 
             
            End If 
             
        End If 
         
        GoTo LineLoop 
 
Line2: 
       If (ifill4 < ifill6) Then 
             
            If (ifill2 <= iRes And ifill4 <= iRes And ifill9 <= iRes) Then 
             
                iMatch = iMatch + 1 
                iloop = iloop + 1 
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            Else 
             
                iloop = iloop + 1 
             
            End If 
                             
        Else 
         
            If (ifill2 <= iRes And ifill6 <= iRes And ifill7 <= iRes) Then 
             
                iMatch = iMatch + 1 
                iloop = iloop + 1 
             
            Else 
             
                iloop = iloop + 1 
             
            End If 
             
        End If 
         
        GoTo LineLoop 
         
Line3: 
        If (ifill4 < ifill5) Then 
         
            If (ifill3 <= iRes And ifill4 <= iRes And ifill8 <= iRes) Then 
             
                iMatch = iMatch + 1 
                iloop = iloop + 1 
             
            Else 
             
                iloop = iloop + 1 
             
            End If 
                             
        Else 
         
            If (ifill3 <= iRes And ifill5 <= iRes And ifill7 <= iRes) Then 
             
                iMatch = iMatch + 1 
                iloop = iloop + 1 
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            Else 
             
                iloop = iloop + 1 
             
            End If 
             
        End If 
         
        GoTo LineLoop 
         
LineLoop: 
 
    If (iloop <= 10000000) Then 
        GoTo Start2 
    End If 
     
    iB = iMatch 
    iC = iRes 
     
    Sheets("Sheet3").Select 
     
    Range("D" & irow).Select 
    ActiveCell.Value = iB 
    Range("E" & irow).Select 
    ActiveCell.Value = iC 
     
    irow = irow + 1 
    iRes = iRes + 0.001      'increases the resolution by 100 um. 
     
    If (iRes <= 5) Then         'means stop when resolution reaches 5.001cm 
        GoTo Start1 
    End If 
        
    Application.ScreenUpdating = True 
    ActiveWorkbook.Save 
    MsgBox "Done" 
 
End Sub 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C-1. Calculated values for the number of pebbles in numerical simulation up to 
0.3 cm (3000 micrometers).  
Number of Matches Resolution (cm)
0 0
4 0.01
38 0.02
128 0.03
269 0.04
551 0.05
929 0.06
1482 0.07
2192 0.08
3209 0.09
4320 0.1
5767 0.11
7494 0.12
9490 0.13
12045 0.14
14577 0.15
17864 0.16
21261 0.17
25243 0.18
29812 0.19
34219 0.2
39398 0.21
44532 0.22
50020 0.23
56292 0.24
62366 0.25
68886 0.26
75584 0.27
82832 0.28
90220 0.29
98157 0.3  
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APPENDIX D 
 
PBMR-450K Heterogeneous Pebble in core w/ 0 ZrO2 uspheres 
C   Created by E. Travis Gitau 
C   -----Cell Cards----- 
C   TRISO Particle 
1   1   -10.85   -101                   u=1        imp:n=1  $Fuel Kernel 
2   2   -0.980    101 -102              u=1        imp:n=1  $Porous Carbon Layer 
3   2   -1.865    102 -103              u=1        imp:n=1  $IPyC Layer 
4   3   -3.20     103 -104              u=1        imp:n=1  $SiC Layer 
5   2   -1.865    104 -105              u=1        imp:n=1  $OPyC Layer 
6   5   -1.76     105                   u=1        imp:n=1  $Graphite Matrix 
C   TRISO Lattice to fill Pebble 
7   0            -106 107 -108 109 -110 111  lat=1 fill=1 u=2   imp:n=1 
C   Pebble 
8   0              -112  fill=2 u=3 imp:n=1 
9   5   -1.76       112 -113          u=3 imp:n=1           $Non-fuelled region 
10  4   -0.01163211 113 19113 20113 21113 & 
                22113 23113 24113 25113 26113  u=3 imp:n=1  $Helium between pebbles 
C   Transform for BCC Lattice 
C   Transform for fueled region 
11   like 8 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)          
12   like 8 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
13   like 8 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
14   like 8 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 3.464102)  
15   like 8 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)  
16   like 8 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
17   like 8 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
18   like 8 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 3.464102) 
C   Transform of non-fueled region 
19   like 9 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)          
20   like 9 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
21   like 9 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
22   like 9 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 3.464102)  
23   like 9 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)  
24   like 9 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
25   like 9 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
26   like 9 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 3.464102) 
C   Pebble Lattice to fill core 
35  0        203 -204 205 -206 207 -208  lat=1 fill=3 u=4 imp:n=1 
C   Core 
36  0        209 -210 212 -216                 fill=4     imp:n=1 
C   Helium plenum above core 
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37  4   -0.01163211  209 -210 216 -213        imp:n=1        $Plenum 
C   Reflectors 
38  5   -1.76  -209 212 -213 #43              imp:n=1        $Annular reflector 
39  5   -1.76   210 -211 212 -213 #44 #45 #46 imp:n=1        $Outer reflector 
40  5   -1.76  -211 -212 214 #43 #46          imp:n=1        $Lower reflector 
41  5   -1.76  -211 213 -215 #43 #44 #45 #46  imp:n=1        $Upper reflector       
C   Outside Outer Reflector 
42  0        211:-214:215 #45                 imp:n=0 
C   RSS Channels 
43  4   -0.01163211 (-219:-220:-221:-222:-223: & 
       -224:-225:-226:-227) 214 -215          imp:n=1 
C   Control Channels 
44  6  -2.50 (-228:-229:-230:-231:-232:-233:-234:-235: & 
       -236:-237:-238:-239:-240:-241:-242:-243:-244:-245: & 
       -246:-247:-248:-249:-250:-251) 217 -218  imp:n=1 
45  4  -0.01163211 (-228:-229:-230:-231:-232:-233:-234:-235: &    
       -236:-237:-238:-239:-240:-241:-242:-243:-244:-245: & 
       -246:-247:-248:-249:-250:-251) 212 -217  imp:n=1 $Helium to fill void of control 
rod 
C   Helium Channels 
46  4  -0.01163211  (-252:-253:-254:-255:-256:-257:-258: & 
       -259:-260:-261:-262:-263:-264:-265:-266:-267:-268: & 
       -269:-270:-271:-272:-273:-274:-275:-276:-277:-278: & 
       -279:-280:-281:-282:-283:-284:-285:-286:-287) 214 -215 imp:n=1 
 
C   -----Surface Cards----- 
C   TRISO Particle 
101   so   0.025                 $Fuel Kernal D=0.05cm 
102   so   0.0345                $Porous Carbon Buffer t=0.0095cm 
103   so   0.0385                $IPyC t=0.004cm 
104   so   0.042                 $SiC t=0.0035cm 
105   so   0.046                 $OPyC t=0.004cm 
C   TRISO Lattice  
106   px   0.0817046 
107   px  -0.0817046 
108   py   0.0817046 
109   py  -0.0817046 
110   pz   0.0817046 
111   pz  -0.0817046 
C   Pebble 
112   so   2.5                   $Fuelled region of pebble    
113   so   3.0                   $Non-fuelled region of pebble 
C   Pebble Lattice 
203   px  -3.464102  
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204   px   3.464102  
205   py  -3.464102  
206   py   3.464102  
207   pz  -3.464102  
208   pz   3.464102  
C   Reactor 
209   cz  100                    $Annular reflector 
210   cz  185                    $Fuel/Core region 
211   cz  280                    $Outer reflector 
212   pz  -550                   $Core bottom 
213   pz  550                    $Core top 
214   pz  -645                   $Upper and lower reflector bounds 
215   pz  645 
216   pz  433                    $Where pebbles must end to equal approx. 450K 
217   pz  -365                   $Positions for control rods 
218   pz  830                   
C   RSS Channels 
219   c/z 0 72.6 7.7             $A clockwise 
220   c/z 46.66638 55.61483 7.7  $B 
221   c/z 71.49104 12.60686 7.7  $C 
222   c/z 62.87344 -36.3 7.7     $D 
223   c/z 24.83066 -68.2217 7.7  $E 
224   c/z -24.83066 -68.217 7.7  $F 
225   c/z -62.8734 -36.3 7.7     $G 
226   c/z -71.497 12.60686 7.7   $H 
227   c/z -46.6664 55.61483 7.7  $I 
C   Control Channels 
228   c/z   25.733239  195.463354  7.7   $A clockwise 
229   c/z   75.446039  182.142850  7.7   $B 
230   c/z  120.017316  156.409611  7.7   $C 
231   c/z  156.409611  120.017316  7.7   $D 
232   c/z  182.142850   75.446039  7.7   $E 
233   c/z  195.463354   25.733239  7.7   $F 
234   c/z  195.463354  -25.733239  7.7   $G 
235   c/z  182.142850  -75.446039  7.7   $H 
236   c/z  156.409611  -120.017316 7.7   $I 
237   c/z  120.017316  -156.409611 7.7   $J 
238   c/z   75.446039  -182.142850 7.7   $K 
239   c/z   25.733239  -195.463354 7.7   $L 
240   c/z  -25.733239  -195.463354 7.7   $M 
241   c/z  -75.446039  -182.142850 7.7   $N 
242   c/z  -120.017316 -156.409611 7.7   $O 
243   c/z  -156.409611 -120.017316 7.7   $P 
244   c/z  -182.142850 -75.446039  7.7   $Q 
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245   c/z  -195.463354 -25.733239  7.7   $R 
246   c/z  -195.463354  25.733239  7.7   $S 
247   c/z  -182.142850  75.446039  7.7   $T 
248   c/z  -156.409611 120.017316  7.7   $U 
249   c/z  -120.017316 156.409611  7.7   $V 
250   c/z  -75.446039  182.142850  7.7   $W 
251   c/z  -25.733239  195.463354  7.7   $X 
C   Helium Channels 
252   c/z   21.741000  248.500767  8.5        $A clockwise 
253   c/z   64.562411  240.950197  8.5        $B 
254   c/z  105.422125  226.078477  8.5        $C 
255   c/z  143.078642  204.337477  8.5        $D 
256   c/z  176.387787  176.387787  8.5        $E 
257   c/z  204.337477  143.078642  8.5        $F 
258   c/z  226.078477  105.422125  8.5        $G 
259   c/z  240.950197   64.562411  8.5        $H 
260   c/z  248.500767   21.741000  8.5        $I 
261   c/z  248.500767  -21.741000  8.5        $J 
262   c/z  240.950197  -64.562411  8.5        $K 
263   c/z  226.078477  -105.422125 8.5        $L 
264   c/z  204.337477  -143.078642 8.5        $M 
265   c/z  176.387787  -176.387787 8.5        $N 
266   c/z  143.078642  -204.337477 8.5        $O 
267   c/z  105.422125  -226.078477 8.5        $P 
268   c/z   64.562411  -240.950197 8.5        $Q 
269   c/z   21.741000  -248.500767 8.5        $R 
270   c/z  -21.741000  -248.500767 8.5        $S 
271   c/z  -64.562411  -240.950197 8.5        $T 
272   c/z  -105.422125 -226.078477 8.5        $U 
273   c/z  -143.078642 -204.337477 8.5        $V 
274   c/z  -176.387787 -176.387787 8.5        $W 
275   c/z  -204.337477 -143.078642 8.5        $X 
276   c/z  -226.078477 -105.422125 8.5        $Y 
277   c/z  -240.950197 -64.562411  8.5        $Z 
278   c/z  -248.500767 -21.741000  8.5        $AA 
279   c/z  -248.500767  21.741000  8.5        $BB 
280   c/z  -240.950197  64.562411  8.5        $CC 
281   c/z  -226.078477 105.422125  8.5        $DD 
282   c/z  -204.337477 143.078642  8.5        $EE 
283   c/z  -176.387787 176.387787  8.5        $FF 
284   c/z  -143.078642 204.337477  8.5        $GG 
285   c/z  -105.422125 226.078477  8.5        $HH 
286   c/z  -64.562411  240.950197  8.5        $II 
287   c/z  -21.741000  248.500767  8.5        $JJ 
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C   -----Data Cards----- 
C   Material Cards 
m1    92235.66c -0.04964443      $Fuel Kernal-UO2-5.7 wt% U-235 
      92238.66c -0.83181731      $5.7 wt % is start-up enrichment 
      8016.66c  -0.11853826 
m2    6000.66c   1               $Carbon for non-fuelled region 
mt2   grph.01t 
m3    14028.66c -0.64370         $SiC Layer 
      14029.66c -0.03376 
      14030.66c -0.02318 
      6000.66c  -0.29936 
mt3   grph.01t 
m4    2003.66c  -0.00000137      $Helium density=0.01163211 g/cc 
      2004.66c  -0.99999863      $          at 300K and 70 Bar 
m5    6000.66c  -0.999998        $Nuclear grade graphite w/2ppm boron impurities 
      5010.66c  -0.000002 
mt5   grph.01t 
m6    6000.66c  -0.23069795      $Control Material-B4C 
      5010.66c  -0.76930205 
mt6   grph.01t 
C   Source Card 
kcode 1000 1.0 50 750 
ksrc 42.307 -105.51 -80.914 
mode n 
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APPENDIX E 
 
PBMR-450K Heterogeneous Pebble in core w/ 5 ZrO2 uspheres in FR 
C   Created by E. Travis Gitau 
C   -----Cell Cards----- 
C   TRISO Particle 
1   1   -10.85   -101                   u=1        imp:n=1  $Fuel Kernel 
2   2   -0.980    101 -102              u=1        imp:n=1  $Porous Carbon Layer 
3   2   -1.865    102 -103              u=1        imp:n=1  $IPyC Layer 
4   3   -3.20     103 -104              u=1        imp:n=1  $SiC Layer 
5   2   -1.865    104 -105              u=1        imp:n=1  $OPyC Layer 
6   5   -1.76     105                   u=1        imp:n=1  $Graphite Matrix 
C   TRISO Lattice to fill Pebble 
7   0            -106 107 -108 109 -110 111  lat=1 fill=1 u=2   imp:n=1 
C   Pebble 
8   0       -112 301  302  303  304  305  fill=2 u=3 imp:n=1 
9   5   -1.76       112 -113          u=3 imp:n=1           $Non-fuelled region 
10  4   -0.01163211 113 19113 20113 21113 & 
                22113 23113 24113 25113 26113  u=3 imp:n=1  $Helium between pebbles 
C   Transform for BCC Lattice 
C   Transform for fueled region 
11   like 8 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)          
12   like 8 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
13   like 8 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
14   like 8 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 3.464102)  
15   like 8 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)  
16   like 8 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
17   like 8 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
18   like 8 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 3.464102) 
C   Transform of non-fueled region 
19   like 9 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)          
20   like 9 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
21   like 9 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
22   like 9 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 3.464102)  
23   like 9 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)  
24   like 9 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
25   like 9 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
26   like 9 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 3.464102) 
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C   Pebble Lattice to fill core 
35  0        203 -204 205 -206 207 -208  lat=1 fill=3 u=4 imp:n=1 
C   Core 
36  0        209 -210 212 -216                 fill=4     imp:n=1 
C   Helium plenum above core 
37  4   -0.01163211  209 -210 216 -213        imp:n=1        $Plenum 
C   Reflectors 
38  5   -1.76  -209 212 -213 #43              imp:n=1        $Annular reflector 
39  5   -1.76   210 -211 212 -213 #44 #45 #46 imp:n=1        $Outer reflector 
40  5   -1.76  -211 -212 214 #43 #46          imp:n=1        $Lower reflector 
41  5   -1.76  -211 213 -215 #43 #44 #45 #46  imp:n=1        $Upper reflector       
C   Outside Outer Reflector 
42  0        211:-214:215 #45                 imp:n=0 
C   RSS Channels 
43  4   -0.01163211 (-219:-220:-221:-222:-223: & 
       -224:-225:-226:-227) 214 -215          imp:n=1 
C   Control Channels 
44  6  -2.50 (-228:-229:-230:-231:-232:-233:-234:-235: & 
       -236:-237:-238:-239:-240:-241:-242:-243:-244:-245: & 
       -246:-247:-248:-249:-250:-251) 217 -218  imp:n=1 
45  4  -0.01163211 (-228:-229:-230:-231:-232:-233:-234:-235: &    
       -236:-237:-238:-239:-240:-241:-242:-243:-244:-245: & 
       -246:-247:-248:-249:-250:-251) 212 -217  imp:n=1 $Helium to fill void of control 
rod 
C   Helium Channels 
46  4  -0.01163211  (-252:-253:-254:-255:-256:-257:-258: & 
       -259:-260:-261:-262:-263:-264:-265:-266:-267:-268: & 
       -269:-270:-271:-272:-273:-274:-275:-276:-277:-278: & 
       -279:-280:-281:-282:-283:-284:-285:-286:-287) 214 -215 imp:n=1 
C   ZrO2-Y2O3 microspheres 
47  7   -6.02  -301:-302:-303:-304:-305 u=3 imp:n=1 
48   like 47 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
49   like 47 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
50   like 47 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 3.464102)  
51   like 47 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)  
52   like 47 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
53   like 47 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
54   like 47 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 3.464102) 
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55   like 47 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102) 
 
C   -----Surface Cards----- 
C   TRISO Particle 
101   so   0.025                 $Fuel Kernal D=0.05cm 
102   so   0.0345                $Porous Carbon Buffer t=0.0095cm 
103   so   0.0385                $IPyC t=0.004cm 
104   so   0.042                 $SiC t=0.0035cm 
105   so   0.046                 $OPyC t=0.004cm 
C   TRISO Lattice  
106   px   0.0817046 
107   px  -0.0817046 
108   py   0.0817046 
109   py  -0.0817046 
110   pz   0.0817046 
111   pz  -0.0817046 
C   Pebble 
112   so   2.5                   $Fuelled region of pebble    
113   so   3.0                   $Non-fuelled region of pebble 
C   Pebble Lattice 
203   px  -3.464102  
204   px   3.464102  
205   py  -3.464102  
206   py   3.464102  
207   pz  -3.464102  
208   pz   3.464102  
C   Reactor 
209   cz  100                    $Annular reflector 
210   cz  185                    $Fuel/Core region 
211   cz  280                    $Outer reflector 
212   pz  -550                   $Core bottom 
213   pz  550                    $Core top 
214   pz  -645                   $Upper and lower reflector bounds 
215   pz  645 
216   pz  433                    $Where pebbles must end to equal approx. 450K 
217   pz  -365                   $Positions for control rods 
218   pz  830                   
C   RSS Channels 
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219   c/z 0 72.6 7.7             $A clockwise 
220   c/z 46.66638 55.61483 7.7  $B 
221   c/z 71.49104 12.60686 7.7  $C 
222   c/z 62.87344 -36.3 7.7     $D 
223   c/z 24.83066 -68.2217 7.7  $E 
224   c/z -24.83066 -68.217 7.7  $F 
225   c/z -62.8734 -36.3 7.7     $G 
226   c/z -71.497 12.60686 7.7   $H 
227   c/z -46.6664 55.61483 7.7  $I 
C   Control Channels 
228   c/z   25.733239  195.463354  7.7   $A clockwise 
229   c/z   75.446039  182.142850  7.7   $B 
230   c/z  120.017316  156.409611  7.7   $C 
231   c/z  156.409611  120.017316  7.7   $D 
232   c/z  182.142850   75.446039  7.7   $E 
233   c/z  195.463354   25.733239  7.7   $F 
234   c/z  195.463354  -25.733239  7.7   $G 
235   c/z  182.142850  -75.446039  7.7   $H 
236   c/z  156.409611  -120.017316 7.7   $I 
237   c/z  120.017316  -156.409611 7.7   $J 
238   c/z   75.446039  -182.142850 7.7   $K 
239   c/z   25.733239  -195.463354 7.7   $L 
240   c/z  -25.733239  -195.463354 7.7   $M 
241   c/z  -75.446039  -182.142850 7.7   $N 
242   c/z  -120.017316 -156.409611 7.7   $O 
243   c/z  -156.409611 -120.017316 7.7   $P 
244   c/z  -182.142850 -75.446039  7.7   $Q 
245   c/z  -195.463354 -25.733239  7.7   $R 
246   c/z  -195.463354  25.733239  7.7   $S 
247   c/z  -182.142850  75.446039  7.7   $T 
248   c/z  -156.409611 120.017316  7.7   $U 
249   c/z  -120.017316 156.409611  7.7   $V 
250   c/z  -75.446039  182.142850  7.7   $W 
251   c/z  -25.733239  195.463354  7.7   $X 
C   Helium Channels 
252   c/z   21.741000  248.500767  8.5        $A clockwise 
253   c/z   64.562411  240.950197  8.5        $B 
254   c/z  105.422125  226.078477  8.5        $C 
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255   c/z  143.078642  204.337477  8.5        $D 
256   c/z  176.387787  176.387787  8.5        $E 
257   c/z  204.337477  143.078642  8.5        $F 
258   c/z  226.078477  105.422125  8.5        $G 
259   c/z  240.950197   64.562411  8.5        $H 
260   c/z  248.500767   21.741000  8.5        $I 
261   c/z  248.500767  -21.741000  8.5        $J 
262   c/z  240.950197  -64.562411  8.5        $K 
263   c/z  226.078477  -105.422125 8.5        $L 
264   c/z  204.337477  -143.078642 8.5        $M 
265   c/z  176.387787  -176.387787 8.5        $N 
266   c/z  143.078642  -204.337477 8.5        $O 
267   c/z  105.422125  -226.078477 8.5        $P 
268   c/z   64.562411  -240.950197 8.5        $Q 
269   c/z   21.741000  -248.500767 8.5        $R 
270   c/z  -21.741000  -248.500767 8.5        $S 
271   c/z  -64.562411  -240.950197 8.5        $T 
272   c/z  -105.422125 -226.078477 8.5        $U 
273   c/z  -143.078642 -204.337477 8.5        $V 
274   c/z  -176.387787 -176.387787 8.5        $W 
275   c/z  -204.337477 -143.078642 8.5        $X 
276   c/z  -226.078477 -105.422125 8.5        $Y 
277   c/z  -240.950197 -64.562411  8.5        $Z 
278   c/z  -248.500767 -21.741000  8.5        $AA 
279   c/z  -248.500767  21.741000  8.5        $BB 
280   c/z  -240.950197  64.562411  8.5        $CC 
281   c/z  -226.078477 105.422125  8.5        $DD 
282   c/z  -204.337477 143.078642  8.5        $EE 
283   c/z  -176.387787 176.387787  8.5        $FF 
284   c/z  -143.078642 204.337477  8.5        $GG 
285   c/z  -105.422125 226.078477  8.5        $HH 
286   c/z  -64.562411  240.950197  8.5        $II 
287   c/z  -21.741000  248.500767  8.5        $JJ 
C   ZrO2-Y2O3 Microspheres   
301   s   -0.0817046   0.0817046    1.0621598   0.05 
302   s   -1.5523874   0.7353414   -1.3889782   0.05 
303   s    0.7353414   -0.4085230  -1.0621598   0.05 
304   s    1.0621598   1.3889782    1.7157966   0.05 
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305   s   -0.7353414   -1.0621598   0.0817046   0.05 
 
C   -----Data Cards----- 
C   Material Cards 
m1    92235.66c -0.04964443      $Fuel Kernal-UO2-5.7 wt% U-235 
      92238.66c -0.83181731      $5.7 wt % is start-up enrichment 
      8016.66c  -0.11853826 
m2    6000.66c   1               $Carbon for non-fuelled region 
mt2   grph.01t 
m3    14028.66c -0.64370         $SiC Layer 
      14029.66c -0.03376 
      14030.66c -0.02318 
      6000.66c  -0.29936 
mt3   grph.01t 
m4    2003.66c  -0.00000137      $Helium density=0.01163211 g/cc 
      2004.66c  -0.99999863      $          at 300K and 70 Bar 
m5    6000.66c  -0.999998        $Nuclear grade graphite w/2ppm boron impurities 
      5010.66c  -0.000002 
mt5   grph.01t 
m6    6000.66c  -0.23069795      $Control Material-B4C 
      5010.66c  -0.76930205 
mt6   grph.01t 
m7    40090.66c -0.36415         $97%ZrO2-3%Y2O3 partially stablized 
      40091.66c -0.08030 
      40092.66c -0.12408 
      40094.66c -0.12849 
      40096.66c -0.02114 
      8016.66c  -0.25823 
      39089.66c -0.02363 
C   Source Card 
kcode 1000 1.0 50 750 
ksrc 42.307 -105.51 -80.914 
mode n 
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APPENDIX F 
 
PBMR-450K Heterogeneous Pebble in core w/ 5 ZrO2 uspheres in NFR 
C   Created by E. Travis Gitau 
C   -----Cell Cards----- 
C   TRISO Particle 
1   1   -10.85   -101                   u=1        imp:n=1  $Fuel Kernel 
2   2   -0.980    101 -102              u=1        imp:n=1  $Porous Carbon Layer 
3   2   -1.865    102 -103              u=1        imp:n=1  $IPyC Layer 
4   3   -3.20     103 -104              u=1        imp:n=1  $SiC Layer 
5   2   -1.865    104 -105              u=1        imp:n=1  $OPyC Layer 
6   5   -1.76     105                   u=1        imp:n=1  $Graphite Matrix 
C   TRISO Lattice to fill Pebble 
7   0            -106 107 -108 109 -110 111  lat=1 fill=1 u=2 imp:n=1 
C   Pebble 
8   0          -112                                fill=2 u=3 imp:n=1 
9   5   -1.76   112 -113  301  302  303  304  305 u=3 imp:n=1           $Non-fuelled region 
10  4   -0.01163211 113 19113 20113 21113 & 
                22113 23113 24113 25113 26113  u=3 imp:n=1  $Helium between pebbles 
C   Transform for BCC Lattice 
C   Transform for fueled region 
11   like 8 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)          
12   like 8 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
13   like 8 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
14   like 8 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 3.464102)  
15   like 8 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)  
16   like 8 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
17   like 8 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
18   like 8 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 3.464102) 
C   Transform of non-fueled region 
19   like 9 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)          
20   like 9 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
21   like 9 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
22   like 9 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 3.464102)  
23   like 9 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)  
24   like 9 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
25   like 9 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
26   like 9 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 3.464102) 
C   Pebble Lattice to fill core 
35  0        203 -204 205 -206 207 -208  lat=1 fill=3 u=4 imp:n=1 
C   Core 
36  0        209 -210 212 -216                 fill=4     imp:n=1 
C   Helium plenum above core 
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37  4   -0.01163211  209 -210 216 -213        imp:n=1        $Plenum 
C   Reflectors 
38  5   -1.76  -209 212 -213 #43              imp:n=1        $Annular reflector 
39  5   -1.76   210 -211 212 -213 #44 #45 #46 imp:n=1        $Outer reflector 
40  5   -1.76  -211 -212 214 #43 #46          imp:n=1        $Lower reflector 
41  5   -1.76  -211 213 -215 #43 #44 #45 #46  imp:n=1        $Upper reflector       
C   Outside Outer Reflector 
42  0        211:-214:215 #45                 imp:n=0 
C   RSS Channels 
43  4   -0.01163211 (-219:-220:-221:-222:-223: & 
       -224:-225:-226:-227) 214 -215          imp:n=1 
C   Control Channels 
44  6  -2.50 (-228:-229:-230:-231:-232:-233:-234:-235: & 
       -236:-237:-238:-239:-240:-241:-242:-243:-244:-245: & 
       -246:-247:-248:-249:-250:-251) 217 -218  imp:n=1 
45  4  -0.01163211 (-228:-229:-230:-231:-232:-233:-234:-235: &    
       -236:-237:-238:-239:-240:-241:-242:-243:-244:-245: & 
       -246:-247:-248:-249:-250:-251) 212 -217  imp:n=1 $Helium to fill void of control 
rod 
C   Helium Channels 
46  4  -0.01163211  (-252:-253:-254:-255:-256:-257:-258: & 
       -259:-260:-261:-262:-263:-264:-265:-266:-267:-268: & 
       -269:-270:-271:-272:-273:-274:-275:-276:-277:-278: & 
       -279:-280:-281:-282:-283:-284:-285:-286:-287) 214 -215 imp:n=1 
C   ZrO2-Y2O3 microspheres 
47  7   -6.02  -301:-302:-303:-304:-305 u=3 imp:n=1 
48   like 47 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
49   like 47 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
50   like 47 but trcl=(-3.464102 3.464102 3.464102)  
51   like 47 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102)  
52   like 47 but trcl=(3.464102 -3.464102 3.464102)  
53   like 47 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 -3.464102)  
54   like 47 but trcl=(3.464102 3.464102 3.464102) 
55   like 47 but trcl=(-3.464102 -3.464102 -3.464102) 
 
C   -----Surface Cards----- 
C   TRISO Particle 
101   so   0.025                 $Fuel Kernal D=0.05cm 
102   so   0.0345                $Porous Carbon Buffer t=0.0095cm 
103   so   0.0385                $IPyC t=0.004cm 
104   so   0.042                 $SiC t=0.0035cm 
105   so   0.046                 $OPyC t=0.004cm 
C   TRISO Lattice  
106   px   0.0817046 
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107   px  -0.0817046 
108   py   0.0817046 
109   py  -0.0817046 
110   pz   0.0817046 
111   pz  -0.0817046 
C   Pebble 
112   so   2.5                   $Fuelled region of pebble    
113   so   3.0                   $Non-fuelled region of pebble 
C   Pebble Lattice 
203   px  -3.464102  
204   px   3.464102  
205   py  -3.464102  
206   py   3.464102  
207   pz  -3.464102  
208   pz   3.464102  
C   Reactor 
209   cz  100                    $Annular reflector 
210   cz  185                    $Fuel/Core region 
211   cz  280                    $Outer reflector 
212   pz  -550                   $Core bottom 
213   pz  550                    $Core top 
214   pz  -645                   $Upper and lower reflector bounds 
215   pz  645 
216   pz  433                    $Where pebbles must end to equal approx. 450K 
217   pz  -365                   $Positions for control rods 
218   pz  830                   
C   RSS Channels 
219   c/z 0 72.6 7.7             $A clockwise 
220   c/z 46.66638 55.61483 7.7  $B 
221   c/z 71.49104 12.60686 7.7  $C 
222   c/z 62.87344 -36.3 7.7     $D 
223   c/z 24.83066 -68.2217 7.7  $E 
224   c/z -24.83066 -68.217 7.7  $F 
225   c/z -62.8734 -36.3 7.7     $G 
226   c/z -71.497 12.60686 7.7   $H 
227   c/z -46.6664 55.61483 7.7  $I 
C   Control Channels 
228   c/z   25.733239  195.463354  7.7   $A clockwise 
229   c/z   75.446039  182.142850  7.7   $B 
230   c/z  120.017316  156.409611  7.7   $C 
231   c/z  156.409611  120.017316  7.7   $D 
232   c/z  182.142850   75.446039  7.7   $E 
233   c/z  195.463354   25.733239  7.7   $F 
234   c/z  195.463354  -25.733239  7.7   $G 
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235   c/z  182.142850  -75.446039  7.7   $H 
236   c/z  156.409611  -120.017316 7.7   $I 
237   c/z  120.017316  -156.409611 7.7   $J 
238   c/z   75.446039  -182.142850 7.7   $K 
239   c/z   25.733239  -195.463354 7.7   $L 
240   c/z  -25.733239  -195.463354 7.7   $M 
241   c/z  -75.446039  -182.142850 7.7   $N 
242   c/z  -120.017316 -156.409611 7.7   $O 
243   c/z  -156.409611 -120.017316 7.7   $P 
244   c/z  -182.142850 -75.446039  7.7   $Q 
245   c/z  -195.463354 -25.733239  7.7   $R 
246   c/z  -195.463354  25.733239  7.7   $S 
247   c/z  -182.142850  75.446039  7.7   $T 
248   c/z  -156.409611 120.017316  7.7   $U 
249   c/z  -120.017316 156.409611  7.7   $V 
250   c/z  -75.446039  182.142850  7.7   $W 
251   c/z  -25.733239  195.463354  7.7   $X 
C   Helium Channels 
252   c/z   21.741000  248.500767  8.5        $A clockwise 
253   c/z   64.562411  240.950197  8.5        $B 
254   c/z  105.422125  226.078477  8.5        $C 
255   c/z  143.078642  204.337477  8.5        $D 
256   c/z  176.387787  176.387787  8.5        $E 
257   c/z  204.337477  143.078642  8.5        $F 
258   c/z  226.078477  105.422125  8.5        $G 
259   c/z  240.950197   64.562411  8.5        $H 
260   c/z  248.500767   21.741000  8.5        $I 
261   c/z  248.500767  -21.741000  8.5        $J 
262   c/z  240.950197  -64.562411  8.5        $K 
263   c/z  226.078477  -105.422125 8.5        $L 
264   c/z  204.337477  -143.078642 8.5        $M 
265   c/z  176.387787  -176.387787 8.5        $N 
266   c/z  143.078642  -204.337477 8.5        $O 
267   c/z  105.422125  -226.078477 8.5        $P 
268   c/z   64.562411  -240.950197 8.5        $Q 
269   c/z   21.741000  -248.500767 8.5        $R 
270   c/z  -21.741000  -248.500767 8.5        $S 
271   c/z  -64.562411  -240.950197 8.5        $T 
272   c/z  -105.422125 -226.078477 8.5        $U 
273   c/z  -143.078642 -204.337477 8.5        $V 
274   c/z  -176.387787 -176.387787 8.5        $W 
275   c/z  -204.337477 -143.078642 8.5        $X 
276   c/z  -226.078477 -105.422125 8.5        $Y 
277   c/z  -240.950197 -64.562411  8.5        $Z 
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278   c/z  -248.500767 -21.741000  8.5        $AA 
279   c/z  -248.500767  21.741000  8.5        $BB 
280   c/z  -240.950197  64.562411  8.5        $CC 
281   c/z  -226.078477 105.422125  8.5        $DD 
282   c/z  -204.337477 143.078642  8.5        $EE 
283   c/z  -176.387787 176.387787  8.5        $FF 
284   c/z  -143.078642 204.337477  8.5        $GG 
285   c/z  -105.422125 226.078477  8.5        $HH 
286   c/z  -64.562411  240.950197  8.5        $II 
287   c/z  -21.741000  248.500767  8.5        $JJ 
C   ZrO2-Y2O3 Microspheres  
301   s   1.1941   1.6479   2.0716   0.05 
302   s   -0.4606  1.6741   2.1660   0.05 
303   s   -1.2204  0.4440   2.3693   0.05 
304   s   1.8608   1.8908   -0.0422  0.05 
305   s   0.9971   2.0830   1.1451   0.05 
 
C   -----Data Cards----- 
C   Material Cards 
m1    92235.66c -0.04964443      $Fuel Kernal-UO2-5.7 wt% U-235 
      92238.66c -0.83181731      $5.7 wt % is start-up enrichment 
      8016.66c  -0.11853826 
m2    6000.66c   1               $Carbon for non-fuelled region 
mt2   grph.01t 
m3    14028.66c -0.64370         $SiC Layer 
      14029.66c -0.03376 
      14030.66c -0.02318 
      6000.66c  -0.29936 
mt3   grph.01t 
m4    2003.66c  -0.00000137      $Helium density=0.01163211 g/cc 
      2004.66c  -0.99999863      $          at 300K and 70 Bar 
m5    6000.66c  -0.999998        $Nuclear grade graphite w/2ppm boron impurities 
      5010.66c  -0.000002 
mt5   grph.01t 
m6    6000.66c  -0.23069795      $Control Material-B4C 
      5010.66c  -0.76930205 
mt6   grph.01t 
m7    40090.66c -0.36415         $97%ZrO2-3%Y2O3 partially stablized 
      40091.66c -0.08030 
      40092.66c -0.12408 
      40094.66c -0.12849 
      40096.66c -0.02114 
      8016.66c  -0.25823 
      39089.66c -0.02363 
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C   Source Card 
kcode 1000 1.0 50 750 
ksrc 42.307 -105.51 -80.914 
mode n 
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